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ABSTRACT
TAX SRELTERS FOR TE RICH TO REHABILITATE HOUSING FOR THE POOR
Nathan Sherman Betnun
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on November 1,
1971 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of City Planning.
The 1969 Tax Reform Act provided tax incentives for the rehabrilitation
of housing for occupancy by low income families and for eventual tenant
ownership. In particular, Section 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code
now allows a taxpayer to depreciate over 5 years the cost of rehabilitation
meeting certain standards. Section 1039 now allows deferral of the tax
on the sale of low and moderate income property to the tenants if the
proceeds are reinvested in similar property.
The rehabilitation depreciation incentive is not sufficient by itself.
It must be used in conjunction with some other form of subsidy. The
Section 236 limited-dividend program is found to be the most profitable
subsidy program as well as the most harmonious with the goals of a
community-based developer.
To take advantage of Section 167(k) developers create limited
partnerships in which they, as general partners, retain control of the
project and investors, as limited partners, claim ownership of the bulk
of the property for tax purposes. Such ownerzhip enables them to ddUct
large amounts during the five years of maximum depreciation and additional
amounts during the period of construction.
With the depreciation, however, comes a large tax on sale. All methods
of avoiding this tax, except death, are ineffective. A sale to the tenants
is likely to benefit the investors only if the project looks like it might
otherwise go into foreclosure. Then, tenants may not want to own the
property. Generally, investors plan to hold the property for twenty years
at which time the tax is tolerably low.
Based on this assumption regarding sale, investors are willing to
pay as much as 32 percent of the mortgage for the right to the tax benefits
and limited cash dividends from a typical project. This amount translates
into an after tax rate of return of 25 percent for investors in a 50 percent
tax bracket.
Even this high of a return is shown to be insufficient in view of
the risks, particularly the risk of foreclosure. Such an occurrence requires
the Investors to pay a large tax. As a result of this tax the cost to the
Government of using the investors' fund is no greater than their own cost
of borrowing. Alternatively, the use of investor funds will be costly but
will significantly reduce the incidence of foreclosure.
The net profit to developers is found to be twice as great on a Section
236 rehabilitation project as on a new project of the same size. However,
the typical 236 new project in cities where rehabilitation is occurring is
2.2 times as large as the typical 236 rehabilitation project and requires
no more effort on the part of the developer.
The only excess cost5 in the tax ehanism are found to be the am3unt
going to the broker on the zale of the limited partnership interests and the
amount of tax benefits prcvided to those investors in higher tax brackets
than the marginal 50 percent bracket.
The non-tax subsidy costs for a rehabilitation project are found to
be considerably larger than the developer's incentive. The 236 interest
subsidy is found to be the largest cost and least efficient in comparison
with alternatives, in terms of cost per dwelling unit.
Consideration is given to several proposed incentive mechanisms for
rihabilitation and tenant ownership. A shift to a tax credit system is
found to be a marginal change which will be more efficient in terms of
cost than the present system. The substitution of a low tax for the
reinvestment requirement is suggested as a more effective means than
Section 1039 to induce tenant ownership. A variation of the turnkey
public housing program is suggested as, at least theoretically, the cheap-
est and most effective way to induce rehabilitation and tenant ownership.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard Frieden
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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A. INTRODUCTION
Two of the goals of the 1969 Tax Reform Act were to provide an
incentive for the rehabilitation of housing for low income people and to
encourage the sale of such housing to tenants. Section 167(k) of the
-Internal Revenue Code now allows a taxpayer to depreciate over five years
the cost of rehabilitating a building for occupancy by low income tenants.
The amount depreciable includes not only the equity the taxpayer has
in the property, but the debt portion as well. Thus a taxpayer can
receive $200,000 each year in depreciation benefits over a five year
period by using borrowed money to purchase property and making $1,000,000
worth of improvements on it. These deductions can shelter other personal
income. To a taxpayer in a 50 percent bracket these benefits are worth
$100,000 in tax savings annually over this period; to a taxpayer in a
70 percent bracket they are worth $140,000 per year. Only on a sale of
the purchased property will any of this tax savings be recouped by the
Federal Government.
Senator Carl Curtis proclaimed on the Senate floor:
A 5 year write-off of this nature is a powerful and effective
incentive to rebuilding and rehabilitating existing housing
facilities. It will result in the rehabilitation of deteriorating
neighborhoods and sluln areas. It will do this with private
capital, saving the taxpayers' money.1
(Emphasis added)
In opposition Senator Albert Gore argued:
This should be called the syndicate loophole--or loopholes--
because it opens the way for high bracket income taxpayers, people
in the 70 percent bracket, to^ combine into an investment syndicate
to buy tax deductions from railroads, from housing combines,
and from manufacturing combines with respect to pollution
abatement.2
Senator Gore was referring to the fact that most housing tax shelters, like
other tax shelters, are sold to groups of wealthy investors, known as
syndicates. Most developers either do not have enough taxable income they
want to shelter or have far too many deductions to optimally use all of them.
Developers have found that tax losses generated from moderate income
housing-developments can be sold to a group or syndicate of outside investors.3
The legal framework which most developers use is the limited partnership.
Wealthy investors pay the developer a capital contribution for the right to a
limited partnership interest in the project. As limited partners, the
investors treat their proportionate share of all of the partnership's income,
losses, profits, gains, and deduction. as part of their personal income tax
returns. They further are entitled to receive a share in any annual cash
dividends of any gains from the sale of the partnership property. The
developer or whoever else serves as general partner has total operational
control of the project. The general partners are liable, under local law,
for all claims against the partnership. The limited partners are liable
only to the extent of their investment provided they refrain from asserting
control over the operation of the project.
At the same time that Congress was encouraging such complicated
patters of ownership by the rich, it was also attempting to encourage
tenant ownership. The Senate Finance Committee stated in its report on the
1969 Tax Reform Act:
In the case of federally-assisted housing projects
(where the return to the investor is limited to
approximately 6 percent) the Government is inter-
ested in encouraging the sale of these Government-
ansted housing projects to the lower income occupants
or to a tax-exempt organization which manages the
property on their behalf (such as cooperatives and
condominiums).5
Congress was responding to evidence that tenant ownership prevents the
deterioration of housing. In his classic study of 566 slum properties in
Newark, New Jersey, George Sternlieb concluded:
The factor of ownership is the single most basic
variable which accounts for variations in the
maintenance of slum properties. Good parcel maint- 6
enance typically is a function of resident ownership.
The mechanism devised by Congress to encourage tenant ownership is
Section 1039 of the Internal Revenue Cod% known as the rollover provision.
This provision allows the owner of a federally-assisted development to defer
paying a tax on the disposition of the property to a tenant organization,
provided he reinvests in a similar project. The pattern Congress seems to
be suggesting is that developers use funds provided by limited partner
investors to rehabilitate housing for low income families and sell the prop-
erty to the tenants at a low price as soon as the five-year depreciation
schedule runs out.
Literature on the Five-Year Write-Off
Government and academic studies on the 5-year write-off suggest that it
will be a costly program. The U.S. Treasury and the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation have estimated that Section 167(k) will cost the
Federal Government approximately $330 million per year by 1979 in foregone
tax revenues should it be extended that long. However, the loss would be
only $15 million in 1970 and $200 million in 1974.7 The assumptions used
to arrive at these figures are that one-half of all publicly-assisted
rehabilitations are for the rental market, that the average cost of
rehabilitation is $10,000 per unit, that the average investor is in the
50 percent tax bracket, and that HUD 1969 estimates for 2,000,000 rehab-
ilitation starts between 1969 and 1978 are accurate. What these figures
imply is that nearly all of the rehabilitation benefits are windfall gains
for developers of low income rehabilitation. The HUD estimates were made
before the enactment of Section 167(k) and without regard for its enactment.
In fact, the HUD 1970 estimate for rehabilitation starts during the decade
of 1969 to 1978 is 1,000,000 or one-half their own estimate a year earlier.
HUD concluded that:
A major consideration heading to this downward revision
is the high cost of rehabilitation of older structures
brought on by the general rise in construction costs.
In addition, as it turns out there are relatively few cities
which have a concentration of large blocks of units for
which rehabilitation is feasible.6
HUD did mention that, the 5-year writeoff of rehabilitation expenditures
permitted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 would create new investor interest
in rehabilitation. 9 Yet, clearly, the number of rehabilitations which HUD
expects will be started because of the 5-year writeoff is minimal.
A researcher for HUD, Arnold Diamond, has since found that 167(k)
coupled with the limited-dividend Section 236 subsidy program can be very
profitable. In his "Tax Incentives for Section 236 Rehabilitation," he
suggests that the rate of return to the owner of a 236 project taking the
5-year writeoff is 34 percent.(p. 19). However, the assumptions he makes
are soatypic-l his numbers have little empirical validity. He assumes
that the developers of the project are also the owners.10 He further
assumes that the project will be sold at the end of 6 years for the original
replacement cost, His point that 236-167(k) combination can be highly
profitable is, however, well-taken.
Emil Sunley, economist for the Department of the Treasury, in "Tax
Incentive for the Rehabilitation of Housing," measures the incentive value
of Section 167(k) in several ways. He finds that the difference between a
five year write off and the previously most accelerated form of depreciation
available (double declining over 20 years) for a taxpayer in a 50 percent
bracket is equivalent to a reduction in the cost of a rehabilitated building
by 16.5 percent, a decrease in the effective tax rate from 50 to 35.7 percent,
an increase in the rate of return to 19.3 percent, or an investment tax
credit of 14.1 percent. 1 2 He shows that each.of these measures has a
far greater impact on an investor in a 70 percent tax bracket. Sunley's
indexes, however, assume that the developer of the project is also the owner
for tax purposes.
Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Stanley Surrey, is known
as the father of the school which proclaims that the tax system is generally
an inefficient means to provide incentives. In his article, "Tax Incentives
as a Device for Implementing Government Policy," Surrey concludes that tax
incentives lead to confusion and divided authority in the legislative and
administrative process, cause difficulties in budgetary control, distort the
perception and setting of national priorities, and provide dangers to the
tax structure, itself. In another article, "Federal Income Tax Reform," Surrey
details many of his criticisms of Section 167(k). He states:
An increase in the supply of low and moderate income
housing is clearly high on our national agenda, and
this goal will require considerable federal assistance.
But the crucial question is why that federal assistance should
in the end be shaped around a tax expenditure policy never planned
for that purpose and which as a consequence is thoroughly
inequitable from a tax standpoint and inefficient from a
housing standpoint. (p. 403)
James Wallace in "The Role of Federal Income Tax Incentives in the
Development and Operation of Low- and Moderate-Income Houting, " pursues
Surrey's argument with numerical examples. Using a 10 percent discount rate,
Wallace finds that the present value of the tax lo&ses to the investors on a
typical project is $570,000 compared with $360,000 which could have been
provided directly to the developer for the same incentive. (p. 15)
What none of these papers have done is to de L ermine the appropriate
level .of net incentive that should go to the developer and what form this
incentive should take. In the words of Stanley Surrey:
Perhaps when all the parties to a proposed low-income
housing venture come together and put in their con-
tributions--the insurance company with its loan, the
investor with his equity, the developer with .his
packaging, HUD with its subsidy check for the
interest on the loan and maybe its check for rent
supplements--still the venture will not move until
the Treasury appears to put in its tax benefit
check. But no one has really inquired just how
large that Treasury check must be to make the
venture feasible. The Treasury check simply
arrives without any realistic financial
relationship to the venture.. .The study that
is sorely required is how neceszsary is that
- Treasury check and, to the extent it is necessary,
how can the assistance it fegesents be shifted to
direct federal assistance. 3
Literature on the Rollover
To the best knowledge of the author, a 1039 tax-deferred rollover to a
tenant group has yet to be attempted in actual practice. The IRS has yet to
issue regulations on this section. The literature about 1039 reaches
conflicting conclusions. None of it has included all of the subtle, but
important, factors in analyzing whether a rollover would ever be feasible.
The way that Congress expects the rollover to work, as seen through the
report of the Senate Finance Committee, is to allow the tenants to buy the
property at a lower price than anyone else. Their report stated:
The maximum sales price permitted under these
programs under present law is the amount the
individual has invested in the property, plus an
amount necessary to retire the outstanding mortgage
liability and the taxes payable as a result of the
sale. By providing that 'no gain is to be recognized
in these cases, it would be possible to decrease
the sales price to the occupants or a tax-exempt
organization managing these properties. The
committee believes this result would be desirable.
This should enable them to make purchases they otherwise
could not make.14
Willis Ritter and Emil Sunley in "Real Estate and Tax Reform," make the
same arguments as the Senate Finance Committee report. They claim that the
rollover will increase the marketability of units. The new arguments they
13
raise are that a rollover will allow greater interest deductions for the
same size m6tgage and allow a. new round of construction cost deductions
(p.42). They, however, like the Senate Finance Committee, fail to discuss
the price which tenants can afford in comparison with the price which
developers demand.
Arnold Diamond of HUD claims that a rollover will significantly increase
the rate of return to the investor. 1 5 Yet, he makes his comparison between
an investor selling the project at the end of the sixth year on the open
market and an investor rolling the project over to the tenants at that
point and reinvesting in a second project for another six years. Simply
holding the first project for another six to fourteen years will also
16
significantly increase the rate of return to the investor. A more
appropriate comparison would be between rolling over into a second project
after 6 years to hold that project for 6 years and holding the first project
for 12 years. Diamond, like Ritter and Sunley, assume that investors can
redeem enough equity from the sale of the first project to pay the equity
required to invest in the second. Yet, as will be seen, the tenants can pay
little in equity while the developer of the second project will demand a
considerable amount of equity.
John Sexton attacks the assumptions of the Senate Finance Committee
and finds the rollover generally unworkable. 1 7 He sees no reason for the
owners of moderate income property to charge the tenants less than they can
receive from another buyer. Yet, particularly on a rehabilitation project,
the amount that the investors can reasonably expect to receive from any buyer
is far less than the tax cost. 1 8
James Wallace in "Role of Tax Incentives," concludes that a Section
1039 rollover is clearly unfeasible. He finds that investors would be better
off to hold onto the original project. However, his numerical analysis
assumes that the investors will choose to reinvest in another rehabilitation
project rather than in A new project and assumes that they will receive no
charitable deduction or cash from the tenants.
Nathan Betnun and David Judelson in "Tax Incentives for Rehabilitation,"
and Judelson in "Incentives and Subsidies," agree with Wallace's conclusion
that a rollover is clearly unfeasible. Both of these papers are correct
in their assumptions about perceptions held by investors. However, they
fail to quantify the gap between h.ding the first and rolling over into
the second, and they fail to consider means to bridge this gap.
Summary
This thesis attempts to evaluate the amount of subsidy and incentive
necessary for housing to be rehabilitated for low income people and the
form the subsidy and incentive should take. The basic approach is to
consider how the present system operates and then to compare it with
alternatives. The questions that are asked are: Who serves as developers?
What are their motives? What type of financing do they use? How much do they
earn on a given project? Is this an appropriate amount? If not, what is?
How much does this incentive cost the Federal Government? How else might
the inventive be structured to provide the appropriate level at a lower cost?
Cutting across this analysis are questions concerning the degree of
tenant and community control. Can tenant and community groups use the
limited partnership mechanism? How much control do they have when they
bring in limited partner investors? Does the Section 1039 rollover realistically
encourage tenant ownership?
Chapter B describes the developers toward whom the incentives are
directed and what their motives are. Developers are found to be of two
basic types--"profit-oriented" and "community-oriented." The chapter shows
that many "community-oriented" organizations are increasingly becoming
profit-oriefited. They axe also oriented toward providing low rents and
toward controlling the development, relocation, construction, tenant
selection, and management processes.
Chapter C shows that the Section 236 limited dividend program in
conjunction with the 167(k) tax shelter is the combination of subsidy
and financing which best satisfies the motivations of developers rehab-
ilitating for low income people. The chapter shows that, contrary to
Congressional expectations, the rents which must be charged by conventional
financing are too high to qualify the apartuents for the 167(k) write-off.
The various existing subsidy programs are examined, including the 236 limited
dividend, 236 non-profit rental, 236 cooperative, 312 direct loan, Turnkey,
and Turnkey leasing programs. The profitability and rent range of the
236 limited dividend program are found to be the overriding factors to
favor it. The amount of community control given up by a community group
to investors is found to be comparatively small.
Chapters D and E lead up to determining the amount of incentive
provided the developer who uses Section 167(k) in conjunction with 236.
Chapter D discusses the value of the annual after tax cash flows gener-
ated by a typical project. The most significant flows result in the five
years of maximum depreciation and in the year of the tax on sale. Methods
of avoiding this tax are discussed. Particular stress is placed on the
Section 1039 rollover as a means of avoiding the tax because it purports
to allow for ownership by the tenants. The conclusion reached is that only
under special circumstances will the investors be as well off to dispose
of the project to the tenants or to anyone else until the 20th year of the
project or until they die..
Chapter E discusses the amount of capital contribution which investors
are willing to make in exchange for the right to take the project cash flows.
The elements of risk are shown to warrant approximately a 33 percent return
rather than the 25 percent currently demanded by investors. Based upon
a 25 percent rate the capital contribution which investors are willing
to make over a two year period is about 32 percent of the mortgage.
Chapter F discusses the net incentive to the developer of a Section
167(k)-236 project. Deductions are made from the capital contribution
for the broker's commission, the contractor's profit, the project equity,
taxes, and an amount to make the project operational. The net incentive
is shown to be 2.0 times as great on rehabilitation as compared with new
construction based upon a 25 percent rate of return to the investors and
1.4 times as great based upon a 33 percent rate of return to the investors.
These high returns are shown to be justified by the fact that the average
new project, which requires little or no more effort than the average
rehabilitation project, has had a mortgage of 2.2 times that of the average
rehabilitation project in cities where rehabilitation has been occuring.
Chapter G examines the efficiency of the rehabilitation incentives
and subsidies from the point of view of the U.S. Treasury In terms of
dwelling units rehabilitated per dollar expended. The broker's commission,
and that portion of the investors' return in excess of the amount afforded
investors in a 50 percent bracket, are found to be the primary inefficiencies
in the tax incentive. The bulk of the average return to the investors
is relatively costless to the Treasury because the high incidence and
severe tax consequences of foreclosure are likely to produce considerable
tax revenue. The 236 interest subsidy is found to be the most inefficient
subsidy in the whole process in terms of cost to the Treasury particularly
in comparison to alternative forms of subsidy.
Chapter H discusses some alternatives to the present development
17
incentives and subsidies and some alternative means to induce tenant
ownership. -A shift to a tax credit system which provides equal benefits
to investors in all brackets would seem to be the most effective marginal
change. A more idealistic system is suggested as well.
FOOTNOTES
1. Congressional Record, p. s16202, December 9, 1969.
2. Ibid., p. s16203, December 9, 1969.
3. According to Professor Daniel Weisberg, Max Kargman of First Realty
was the first to use the limited partnership mechanism with regard to
moderate income housing. (Seminar, Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, January 22, 1971).
4. Uniform Limited Partnership Act (U.L.A.) Sec. 7.
5. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, November 21, 1969,
,P. 2330.
6. The Tenement Landlord, p. 227.
7. U.S. Congress, House, First Annu.l Report on National Housing Goals,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14, as cited in Emil Sunley, "Tax Incentive,"
p. 19. Sunley estimates that the cash grant equivalent of 167(k) would
be $82.5 million in 1970 and increase to $268 million in 1979.
8. U.S. Congress, House, Second Annual Report on National Housing Goals,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 4 As cited in Sunley, op. cit.
9. Ibid., p. 25, (p. 23 in Sunley).
10. This assumption reduces the amount of depreciation allowable by
eliminating the step-up in basis allowable when a developer is actually
paid a fee. See p.44 infra for an explanation of the step-up.
11. See pp.44-47 infra for a discussion of cost of disposition.
12. "Tax Incentive", p. 382, Sunley uses a 15 percent discount rate.
13. "Federal Income Tax Reform", pp. 406-407.
14. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, November 21, 1969,
P. 2330.
15. "Tax Incentives for Section 236 Rehabilitation," p. 15. He shows an
increase in the rate of return from 41 percent per year over 6 years to
56 percent over 12 years. These rates are high because he assumes that
the owners of the project are also the developer and that the owners
discount losses at the same rate as they discount profits. (see pp.
52-57 infra).
16. See Table D-II infra.
17. "Working with the New Tax Deferral Provisions."
18. See pp. 44-49 infra.
B. DEVELOPERS AND INCENTIVES
The groups toward which incentives have been focused are developers
and sponsors. They initiate projects and see that the rehabilitation is
carried out. Through their control passes the funds to pay the other actors,
The functions of the developer are:
1 To obtain control over the property,
2 To obtain necessary community support to allow the project to proceed,
3 To provide seed capital,
4 To obtain interim and permanent financing,
5 To obtain project subsidies,
6 To obtain all leg al documents including clear title and zoning,
7 To engage and oversee the architect,
8 To engage and oversee the contractor,
9 To engage the management agent,
10 To inform and consult with the existing tenants, if any, on the
progress of the project,
11 To supervise the relocation of these tenants, if need be,
12 To maintain finances, and
13 Possibly to initially rent the project.
Whether rehabilitation occurs depends upon whether the developer has
enough incentive to spend the time and effort necessary to perform these
functions. The form of incentive preferred by most professional developers
is, of course, monetary profit. The amount of profit he demands depends
upon the amount of time, effort, and capital .he must expend, particularly
in comparison to other types of development or investment.
Still 57 percent of the multifamily, low income rehabilitation projects
insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were classified as non-
profit developments. These projects were initiated by non-profit sponsors.
The role of the non-profit sponsor is generally to acquire the site, provide
community support, handle tenant relations, and retain ownership of the
property. In certain cases the non-profit sponsor may be the creation of a
profit-oriented developer. In other cases the developer, although the hired
agent of the non-profit sponsor, becomes the decision maker. The most
socially significant type of non-profit sponsor is the community group that
serves as its own developer. Yet, these groups are learning that the profit-
oriented approach to development best serves their goals. These groups
realize that they, like the professional developer, can create limited
partnerships and sell tax shelter.
The most important distinctions between community group-developers
and professionals are in the uses to which they put their profits and
in the compromises they make in trying to appeal to investors.
To the extent that a community group identifies with the tenants, it
may use or sacrifice profits for lower rents, greater tenant satisfaction,
and better relocation services. Profit might also be sacrificud for control
over the jobs created by the project. The Emergency Tenants Council (ETC),
a Puerto Rican group in the South End of Boston, has completed the syndication
of a 71 dwelling unit project. It decided to use a part of the syndication
proceeds to pay staff salaries, a part to invest as seed money for its next
project, and a part to subsidize the management of its buildings. The
Roxbury Action Program (RAP), a black, tenant-oriented group also of Boston,
decided to apply the syndication proceeds from its first project directly
to the reduction of the mortgage and thereby reduction of rents.3 The Columbus
Avenue Tenants Association (CATA), an organization consisting of the tenants
in two large buildings in the South End of Boston, is considering investing
the proceeds they receive from syndication and use the principal to meet
cost overruns both from construction and operation and use the earnings to
support the tenant association and to reduce rents.
Community groups use different criteria from professional developers
in choosing their development team. The profit-oriented developer will
seek the most reputable architect, contractor, attorney, syndication broker,
and management agent he can afford. All of these agents help to determine
the level of confidence which investors will have in the project and hence
the amount they are willing to pay for an interest in it. Community groups,
however, will consider only those architects and contractors who will allow
members of the community to participate in the design and construction
processes. Participation in design would include both an expression of
desires, particularly as to bedroom sizes, and a review of the plans. Parti-
cipation in construction would include hiring and training of community labor.
Whether the architect and contractor, themselves, are from the community is
another significant criterion.
Choice of the attorney and syndication broker are of lesser concern
to the community. Still, preference is certainly given to community
members. Choice of the management agent and control over the replacement
of it, are major concerns of both the community and the investor. The
tenants will have to live with the management. The community would like to
see the fees remain in the community. As will be seen in a later chapter,
the investors look primarily to the management agent to keep the project out
of foreclosure.
The community group will also have several choices to make directly
concerning the present tenants. It must decide how to phase the construction
process to avoid relocation problems but to still keep construction costs
low. It may decide to exclude certain tenants because they have too
high income or are students and hence do not allow the apartment. to qualify
for the five-year write-off.0 The alternative is to accept reduced proceeds
from the sale of the tax shelter. How it makes these choices will depend
upon who its constituency is.
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FOYTNOTES
1.. Adapted from James Morey and Mel Epstein, "Housing Development", p. 15.
2. U.S. Department of H.U.D., "0-2 Forms", June 30, 1970.
3. Alternatively, the syndication proceeds can be invested in bonds
earning, say, 6 percent and withdrawn at an annual rate of 6.62
percent over 40 years, 8.62 percent over 20 years, or 13.38 percent
over 10 years. These amounts compare with saving only 3.04 percent
per year for 40 years of the amount of any part paid on a Section 236
mortgage.
4. Internal Revenue Code Regulations, Sec. 1.167(k)-3(b)(2).
C. FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
Developers of all types who acquire and rehabilitate property generally
require mortgage financing in order to afford it. Until- very recently
lack of financing prohibited rehabilitation in most low income areas. Now
a developer often has several sources of financing for rehabilitation,
only some of which will allow him to use 167(k) depreciation. He might
obtain 1) a conventional loan from a bank, 2) a Section 221(d) 4 market
rate mortgage insured by the FHA, 3) a Section 236 limited-dividend loan
subsidized by HUD, 4) a Section 312 loan direct from HUD, 5) a construction
loan with a turnkey sales commitment, or 6) a conventional loan with a
turnkey leasing commitment. In addition to all of the above, a non-
profit developer can receive financing as a sponsor of a Section 236 non-
profit rental project or of a Section 236 non-profit cooperative project.1
Which of these programs a developer chooses depends upon his own
motives and upon the availability of funds for the program he prefers. As
seen in the previous chapter the profitability of a project is the most
important criterion for the professional developer and an important one
for the community-oriented developer. The level of rents, and the
possibilities of community control and tenant ownership are also important
to community oriented developers. This chapter will compare all of the
above financing programs using all of these criteria.
The conclusion reached is that the 236 limited dividend program is
the most profitable. Those programs which include no subsidies will be
shown to be incompatible with using Section 167(k). The 236 limited
dividend and turnkey leasing programs are shown to best satisfy the needs of
community groups, although funding for the latter is rarely available.
The project which will be used to compare the programs is the rehabi-
litation of the Newcastle Court and Saranac Buildings in the South End of
Boston. This case will be used throughout the paper. The reasons for
using this 6ase are: l) the author is thoroughly familiar with it from
his involvement with the project, 2) the project contains exactly 100 units
to readily allow switching from an analysis by project to an analysis by
unit, 3) the total development costs are reasonably typical of costs on
other rehabilitation projects. The buildings will be nearly gutted. All
of the plumbing and wiring will be replaced; certain walls will be removed.
The rent levels shown for all of these types of financing are based
upon modest assumptions for operation and replacement costs and real estate
taxes to clearly demonstrate the incompatibility of certain financing
methods with 167(k). The $770 per unit per year for operation and replace-
ments3 is minimal. It is in line with the amount suggested by the
Experience Exchange Committee of the Institute of Real Estate Managers.
However, one study of five moderate income housing projects compiled for
the Boston Model City Administration showed these costs as ranging from
$890 to $1450.4 The real estate tax level shown is based upon 16 percent
of gross project income. This rate is generally attainable only under a
special legal arrangement. 5 Generally, real estate taxes average around
18-24 percent of gross rent. 6
Profit Making Programs
The rents projected in Table C-I using conventional financing are
too high to allow the unit to qualify for the five-year write-off.7 The
unit must be held for occupancy by a tenant earning no more than 150
percent of local public housing income admission levels.8 In Boston this
level is $7800 for a family of four. The rent charged cannot exceed 30
percent of the income of a marginally qualified tenant. A rent of $2539 per
.year ($211 per month) is 32 percent of the income of a marginally qualified
Table C-I Derivation of Rent for 100 Unit Project by Type of Financing
Program
Type
Interest
Term (years)
Mortgage %
Mortgage Amt.
Implied Equity
- 236
limited divd.
1%
40
90%
1,252,000
139,000
236
non-prof
1%
40
100%.
1,383,000
0
Conventional
profit
8%
20
70%
968,000
415,000
221(d)4 312
lim, divd. profit
8% 3%
20 20
90% 100%*
1,252,000 1,320,000
139,000 10,000
Calculation of Rent - Annual per Apartment
Operation
Real Estate Taxes
@16% gross
Ieplacements
Dividend @6% equity
Debt Service
Net Market Rent
Interest Subsidy
Net Basic Rent
Vacancy Reserve @,%
Gross Basic Rent
Basic Monthly Rent
Income Served @30%
Income Served @25%
Family of 4 limit-
Boston
Family of 3 limit-
Boston
700
250
70
83
1040
2143
gross 7
130
5207
6248
7800
7190
* 100% of construction costs only.
700
241
70
0
1149
2160
126
5020
6024
7800
7190
700
407
70
249
986
212
0
24Z2
127
2539
211
8463
10156
7800
7190
700
432
70
83
_1277
2562
0
135
225
8990
10788
7800
7190
700
337
70
6
2000
0
2000
1_05
2105
175
7023
8420
7800
7190
family, clearly too high.
The assumptions used in arriving at this. rent are modest. As seen
previously, development costs are below average for extensive rehabilitation,
and operation and replacement costs may even be low. An 8 percent interest
rate and a 70 percent mortgage are certainly minimal for apartment rehab-
ilitation in today's market. The dividend is calculated at only 6 percent
of equity rather than at 15 percent which most investors would expect. The
only way for this conventionally financed rehabilitation project to qual-
ify for the 167(k) write-off would be for the owner to reduce his dividerd
to zero and undermaintain the unit. Even then the potential market would
be limited to a narrow income span paying a high percentage of income for
rent. A far more profitable alternative for an owner intent on using -
conventional financing would be to forego the five-year write-off and
charge a high rent to people who can afford it.
A developer seeking to use Section 221(d) 4 faces the same high
interest rates and relatively short amortization period as under conventional
financing. The 90 percent mortgage it can receive reduces the equity
requirement but forces the rents to be $225 (See Table c-I), far higher
than the $195 maximum to charge a family of four and qualify the rehabilita-
tion costs on the dwelling unit to be written off over five years.
The Section 312 program does allow rents sufficiently low for a
rehabilitated apartment to qualify for the five-year write-off. Still,
a rent of $175 per month can hardly be considered to be within the means of
low income people. The 1969 Housing Act gives priority on 312 loans to
owner-occupants. Only owners of rental property can take depreciation.
Thus, Section 312 will rarely be used in conjunction with 167(k).
Another alternative is the turnkey public housing program. This
program requires the developer to obtain a construction loan from a
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conventional lender and sell the project to the local housing authority.
No tax shelter is available on the normal turnkey program because a tax
shelter implies private ownership. However, certain developers prefer the
turnkey program because they have a guaranteed buyer before they begin.
Construction for Progress, Inc., a subsidiary of American Standard, Inc.
and Celanese Corp. in New York City is able to earn 12 percent after taxes
on a turnkey venture. 9
A community group would certainly have to split any profit it made
with the general contractor unless it could perform this role itself. To
the extent that it insisted upon job training programs which failed to
effectively train inexperienced workers, the profits would be reduced.
The potential profit for a community group on a turnkey project would thus
be slight in most instances.10
The one possibility for more profit is the turnkey leasing program.
Here, the owners of the project lease it to the local housing authority
under Section 10(c) of United States Housing Act of 1937. Leases run for
40 years. The local authority would then sublease the apartments to
individual tenants at subsidized rents. A developer has the opportunity
of syndicating the project to limited partners before executing the lease
with the local authority.11 The problem with the progran is that funding
is scarce and local authorities are reluctant to use the Sec. 10(c)
leasing funds they do have for rehabilitation projects.12 They fear
the useful life of the buildings is likely to be less than 40 years.
The low rents charged in a turnkey public housing project are a
mixed blessing. The rents are approximately 25 percent of the tenants
income, or only $62 per month for a family earning $3000.13 However, a
family of four (in Boston) must earn less than $5700 to qualify, The
problems causet by high concentrations of low income families have been
well documented. 1 4
A turnkey project does allow for a considerable degree of community
control. A community group serving as the developer has complete control
over who it hires to reconstruct the building. It must negotiate with the
local housing authority as to who will serve as the management agent. The
local housing authority reserves the right to fire the management agent.
Turnkey II provides for private management of public housing. However,
the housing authority still reserves the right to fire the management.
Turnkey III provides for tenant ownership through "sweat equity," or
through cash payments as the tenant's income risfis. However, fee owner-
ship does not occur for 13 to 21 years. Elderly people and welfare
mothers, the two groups that head the bulk of public housing families,
are unlikely to ever be able to contribute a sufficient amount of maint-
enance or cash payments to secure even fee ownership.
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The Section 236 program provides FHA mortgage insurance for a 40
year term even though Congress has declared the useful life of the
improvements to be only 5 years. The program subsidizes the debt service
paid by the tenant down to the equivalent of 1 percent interest. The
limited dividend variant provides financing for 90 percent of the total
development cost. The other 10 percent, the implied equity, can be
provided in cash or through a waiver of the Builders and Sponsors Profit
and Risk Allowance. Since this allowance is worth 10 percent of the non-
land costs,16 the minimum cash equity required is generally no more than
2 or 3 percent of the total development costs. Any sponsor who is willing
to limit its annual cash dividend to 6 percent of the original implied
equity can become a limited dividend sponsor, As will be seen in the next
chapter, the discounted net profit to the developer for a project like
Newcastle, would be $193,300 before taxes.
As Table C-I shows the rent required to support this unit under Section
236, limited-dividend financing and pay the maximum dividend would be
17$1562 per year or $130 per month. This rent level falls easily within
the limit allowed for the unit to qualify for the five-year write-off.
Non-Profit Programs
A 236 non-profit rental project has little to recommend it in comparison
with the limited-dividend route. A non-profit 236 cooperative fares some-
what better. The computation of rents for either type of non-profit is
identical. As Table C-I shows, the rents in either type of non-profit
project will be at the most only slightly lower than those in a limited
dividend building. The only variables are the dividend and the mortgage
debt. The dividend has been calculated to be the maximum of 6 percent of
the implied equity or $84 per unit per year. Experience puts it at less than
3 percent. A community organization serving as the general partner in
a limited partnership will be likely to keep the dividend even lower in
order to keep rents at a minimum for a given level of maintenance. Cutting
the dividend reduces the real estate taxes and the vacarcy allowance as
well. Were the dividend to be half of the maximum, the annual rent on
a limited-dividend apartment would be $1505 or $1 per year less than on a
non-profit unit. Were no dividend to materialize, the rent would be $1457
or $105 less than on a non-profit.
The reason the mortgage is larger on the non-profit project than on
the equivalent limited-dividend project is basically that a non-profit
sponsor is allowed a mortgage on 100 percent of the total development costs.
As Table II shows, certain differences arise in the calculation of the
total development cost for the two projects. The most significant difference
is that a limited-dividend developer is entitled to a Builders and Sponsors
Profit and Risk Allowance of 10 percent of all development costs except
land; a non'profit sponsor receives a Builders Profit allowance based upon
a percentage of the actual construction costs. A non-profit also receives
an Amount to Make Project Operation (AMPO) of up to 2 percent of the
mortgage. A limited dividend developer must use his own cash to keep all
of the bills paid before the units are fully rented. The consultant's fee
allowed a non-profit sponsor is likely to appear as a legal and organizational
expense to the same group operating as a limited dividend developer
although the limit is slightly lower. The different fees will be higher
for a non-profit developer because the mortgage amount on which they are
based is higher.
Promoters of cooperative housing boast of lower maintenance costs
in cooperatives than in rental housing. 1 9 However, the reason they give
for this reduction is the psychological identification by the occupant ;with
the property. The same degree of identification is likely to be present
when a tenant organization serves as a general partner for a limited
dividend project or as a sponsor of a non-profit rental project.
The difference between a non-profit and -a limited dividend,limited
partnership project in terms of community control is simply the items of
control which t.he community anticipates that investors will not accept.
Selection of the management agent and of the contractor.would be the most
significant issues of control about which an investor might disagree. Both
of these actors must first be approved by the FHA or state insuring acovncy.
The construction lender must also approve the contractor. Any investor
uneasiness on these issues might be met by monetary guarantees using the
syndication proceeds. Should a package ever pass the agencies, but fail
to produce a high enough price without compromising community control, the
community group may be able to go back to FHA for a 100 percent loan.
Table C-II Comparison between Development of a 236 Project by
Type of Sponsorship
Limited Dividend
Land Improvements
Structures
Builders Overhead @2%b
Builders Profit @6%b
Other Construction Fees
Interest during Construction @0.8%v/2*
Taxes*
Insurance*
FHA Mtg. Ins. Pre. @0.5%v*
FHA Exam Fee @0.3%v
FHA Inspec. Fee @0.5%v
Financin Fee @lv*
AIPO @2)ov
FNMA/GNMA Fee @l.5%v*
Title and Recording
Legal and Organizational
Consultant Fee
Builder & Sponsor Profit & Risk
Subtotal
Land
Total
Mortgage
10,000
1,000, 000
20,000
65,000
50,000
34,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
6,000
13,000
19,000
5,000
15,000
126,000
1,381,000
10,000
1,391,000
1,252,000
Non-Profit
10,000
1,000,000
20,000
80,000
65,000
55,000
34,000
8,000
7,000
,000
7,000
14,000
28,000
21,000
5,000
10,000
5,000
1,373,000
10,000
1,383,000
1,383,000
*Deductible during construction.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e0.
f.
g.o
h.
k.
1.
m.
n.o
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
to
U.
V.
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The primary difference between the non-profit approach and the limited
dividend approach is the profit. No profit would accrue to a community
group serving as sponsor of a non-profit rental project. Members of a
cooperative, however, would be able to take certain deductions on their
own taxable income in place of receiving this profit. Tax deductions are
far less valuable to cooperators than to high income investors. Unlike an
investor, a cooperator cannot deduct depreciation from his income tax. A
member of a cooperative c-n deduct from his personal taxable income only
an amount equal to his share of the real estate taxes and interest paid by
the cooperative.20 The real estate tax deduction is straight forward.
A cooperator can deduct $339 per year from his taxable .income for this
reason. Determination of the interest paid by the cooperator is more complex,21
The most plausible interpretation would show an interest deduction of
$583 although alternative interpretations would show as little as $125
or as much as $1001.
In order to be able to take these deductions a taxpayer must itemize
his deductions rather than take the standard deduction. In 1966 of those
families with incomes less than $5000 per year only 13 percent itemized
their deductions. 2 2 Many of them undoubtedly, already owned their home.
The remaining 87 percent all took the standard deduction. The standard
deduction for a typical family of four earning $5000 would have been $500,
i.e., 10 percent of $5000. 3 The amount itemizable for this family was
certainly less than $500, probably about $300.
Beginning in 1972, however, a taxpayer may take a low income deduction
of $1000 in lieu of either itemizing his deductions or taking the percen-
tage standard deduction. Assuming $919 in project-related deductions
and $300 in other itemizable deductions a taxpayer would be about $31
per year better off by itemizing. (See Table C-III) This savings is
worth about a $2.60 decrease in rent.
Table C-III Tax Savings to Family of Four in 236 Cooperative
With Low Income Allowance With Itemized Deductions
Gross Income 5,000 5,000
Dedudtions -1,000 -1,19
4,000 3,781
Exemptions (4x750) -3,000 -3,000
Taxable Income 1,000 781
Tax @ 14% $140 $109
Certain cooperatives allow for the build-up of equity by the tenant.
A limited partnership can easily structure an equity repayment scheme
which, to the tenant would work exactly the same way as in a cooperative. 2 5
Incoming tenants would buy into the cooperative. Outgoing tenants would
receive a cash payment based upon the amount they paid in at the beginning,
the amount of equity they had contributed in the form of rents, and the
amount of damage they had done to the property. As in a coop, any equity
repayment scheme which provided the outgoing tenant with a large payment
could lead to requiring too high of a payment by an incoming household
and thus restrict the mobility of a tenant desiring to leave. A tenant
organization with substantial syndication proceeds, however, has the option
of creating a sinking fund to subsidize high payouts to those leaving and
low payins for those moving in. When a tenant organization acquires fee
ownership of the property from the limited partners by assuming the mort-
gage, the equity repayment scheme could continue just as though the
project had been a cooperative since the outset.
The only significant difference between a cooperative and a limited
partnership is in who can claim ownership for tax purposes. Clearly, upper
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income investors will pay dearly for this privilege.
Thus, virtually all developers using the. Section 167(k) tax write-
off will also use Section 236 limited-dividend financing. Organizations
which had been using non-profit financing are likely to turn to Section
236 limited-dividend financing to take advantage of 167(k).
Table C-IV
Criteria
Comparative Analysis of Various Rehabilitation Programs
236
Limited-Dividend
236
Non-Profit
Rental
236
Non-Profit
Cooperative
Profit
Rents
Control
Development
team
Management
agent
Roughly 10% the
total development
cost as a discounted
net after taxes *
$121-130
Up to 40% at
public housing
levels
Subject to
approval by FHA,
construction
lender and
investors
Subject to
approval by
FHA and investors
Excess of
sales price
over con-
struction
costs
$126
Up to 40% at
public housing
levels
Subject to
approval by
FNA and con-
struction
lender
Subject to
approval by
FHA
$126
Up to 40% at
public housing
levels
Subject to
approval by
FHA and con-.
struction
lender
Subject to
approval by
FHA
$175
(Uncontrolled)
Subject to
LPA Approval
No limits
$62
Subject to
approval by
LHA and
construction
lender
Subject to
approval by
LHA contin-
ually
Considerable
$62
Subject to
approval by
LHA and
construction
lender
Subject to
approval by
LHA contin-
ually '
* See Appendix
312 Turnkey Turnkey
Leasing
Criteria
Tenant Selection
Fee Owner
236
Limited
Partnership
236 and
167(k) regu-
lations
Partnership
for 5-20 years
236
Non-Profit
Rental
236
regulations
Non-Profit
236
Non-Profit
Cooperative
236
regulations
Tenants
312
No limits
Developers
Turnkey
Public
housing
levels
Local
housing
authority
some tenants
after 13 to
20 years
Turnkey
Leasing
Public
housing
levels
Local
housing
authority.
Tax
Deductions
by Tenants
Non for
5-20 years
None $31/year None None None
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Section 221(d)3 and 221(h) programs are not included because
HUD is phasing them out,
2. At the time of this writing the project is still in the planning stage.
Thus, all of the numbers are likely to change. Still, they represent
reasonable estimates based upon comparable experience and are completely
suitable for usage in this paper. The total development cost is
slightly less than $14,000 per unit. This amount is about $1,000 less
than total development costs on the average Section 2 project (U.S.
Department of HUD, "0-2" forms, through July 31, 1970).
3. The replacement fund is used to replace worn-out items, like
refrigerators.
4. Experience Exchange Committee, Income-Exense Analysis, p. 56. Karlis
Zobs, "Management Operation and Administrative Costs," (for Model
Cities), Table 5. The Newcastle project actually projects operating
costs of over $100 per year more.
5. The City of Boston Tax Assessors Office will make such arrangements.
Organizations granted the status of a Ch.121(A) Corporation (M.G.L.A.)
in Massachusetts are guaranteed this low rate for 40 years.
6. Experience Exchange Committee, op.cit., shows a nationwide average
of 18 percent of gross for low rise buildings with 25 or more units.
It shows an average of 24 percent in Boston.
7. Congress, apparently believed that Section 167(k) can work independently
of other Government subsidies to provide rehabilitated housing for
low income people. The House Ways and Means Committee described 167(k)
thusly:
Your committee's bill also recognizes the importance of
encouraging rehabilitation of buildings for low-cost rental
housing. The tax stimuli aid new construction more than
improvements to existing housing rince it appears that
remodeling of risky low income p: -ects cannot be
conventionally financed as well a:. new housing. (House
Report No. 91-413, 8/2/69, U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News, p. 1819.)
8. I.R.C. Proposed Reg. Sec. 1.167(k)-3(b)(2).
9. Leonard Sucsy, Vice-President-General Manager, seminar at the Harvard
Business School, February 12, 1971.
10. The only example of this process being used by a community group known
to this author occured in the South End of Boston. There, a coalition
of three groups, the People's Elected Urban Renewal Committee,
the South End Tenant's Council, and the Emergency Tenants Council
carried on a series of demonstrations against a local landlord who owned
a block of 100 units of slum property. A community-oriented development
company was drawn in and bought the property. The community groups were
able to exert enough political leverage with local government officials
at the time of an election to make it clear that this developer or any
other developer which may have come onto the scene, would have to
rehabilitate the buildings in a manner consistent with the wishes
of the community. The community considered the alternative of
syndicating the tax shelter under Section 236 but instead chose the
turnkey route. One controlling factor in this case was the apparent
immediate availability of turnkey funds in comparison with 236 funds.
11. The net lease to the housing authority may reduce the value of the
tax shelter slightly because the amount of interest allowed on property
not "used in a trade or business" such as property held under a net
lease, is $25,000. (I.R.C. Sec. 163)
12. The Boston Housing Authority was one of the few authorities to approve
such a project. However, the present director of their long-term
leasing program told the author that they will not approve any
further rehabilitation projects.
13. $62 was the average rent in Boston in 1968. (Metropolitan Area Planning
Council, Federal and State Housing Programs, Vol 2, 1969, p. 21).
14. See, for example, Lee Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls and Jewell Bellusch
and Murray Hausknecht, "Public Housing'- The Contexts of Failure",
in Urban Renewal: People, Politics and Planning (eds. Bellusch and
Hausknecht) pp. 457-61,
15. National Housing Act of 1949.
16. Assuming a minimal identity of interest is established between the
builder and the sponsor.
17. If the local FHA or state insuring office and the local housing
authority are agreeable, the rents can be skewed in such a manner
that the rent on the leased housing unit is higher than the others.
The effect can be to lower the rent in the other units as well.
18. Zobs, op.cit., found no cash dividends being paid out in the 5projects he studied. Certain developers subordinate a portion of their
management fee to a 3 percent cash flow.
19. Roger Willcox, President of Foundation for Cooperative Housing, seminar
at M.I.T., Jan. 14, 1971. In fact the Experience Exchange Committee
of the Institute of Real Estate Management shows the total annual
operating expenses for cooperatives in a nation-wide sample to have been
$169 per room compated with $225 for rental housing (Income-Expense
Analysis p. 239).
20. I.R.C. Sec. 216
21. Theoretically, the cooperator pays interest at 1 percent per year or
about $125 per year at the outset. However, the mortgage is being paid
on the basis of an 8 percent loan. During the first year the bank
holding the mortgage receives $1001 in interest and only $39 in
amortization. The cooperative on behalf of the cooperator pays an
amount equal to the constant payment necessary to retire the debt over
40 years if it we: at 1 percent interest. That amount is $381 per year.
HUD pays the balance of the debt service payment of $659. Even if the
cooperative assumed the entire burden of the amortization and HUD
subsidized only the interest, the cooperator would have paid $342 in
interest rather than only $125. Yet, this interpretation cannot work
throughout the life of the mortgage. Toward the end of the loan
HUD's $659 constant payment exceeds the amount of interest being paid.
Apparently, HUD is subsidizing some of the amortization as well.
The I.R.S. has yet to issue a ruling on this point although according
to Victor Altman of Kruth and Altman, the law firm handling the
account of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing, the I.R.S. has
issued a private ruling on this point. Stanley Surrey of Harvard
Law School told the author in an interview that in his opinion the
cooperator should be able to deduct the entire $1001 in interest paid
to the bank. If the I.R.S. were to treat the subsidy as a form of
public assistance apart from the project, then the subsidy would be
a form of tax-free income to the cooperator and the deduction
-aUowable would be for the full $1001 or interest paid on the mortgage.
The most plausible method of determining the interest paid by the
cooperator is to treat the HUD subsidy in the same manner as income
which a cooperative might earn from commercial rents. This method
calculates the tax deductions by multiplying the rent paid by the
cooperator times the ratio of deductible expenses of the cooperative
to its total expenses. In this. case a cooperator could deduct a
total of $922 ($1609(339+l00l2338) in the first year. If the real
estate tax were still considered to have a value of $339, the interest
deduction would be worth $583 in reduced taxable income. The average
total deduction over the first five years would be $919.
22. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, House Comm. on Ways
and Means, Report # 91-413, Aug. 2, 1969, p. 157. (Compiled by Treasury).
23. I.R.C. Sec. 141(b)
24. I.R.C. Sec. 141(c)
25. David Judelson, John McRae, and Robert Yelton, Tenant Cooperative
Rehabilitation, pp. 98-103.
D. VALUE OF THE AFTER-TAX CASH FLOWS
The incentive value to developers using the combination of Section
167(k) and Section 236 depends upon the value of the after-tax cash
flows from the project, the return demanded by investors, and the amount
which the developer must pay the broker, the contractor, as equity,
in taxes, and as an amount to make the project operational. This
chapter discusses the value of the after tax cash flows generated by the
project including the eventual tax on sale. Special emphasis is placed
upon the Section 1039 rollover not only because it seems to hold the
promise of allowing investors to defer or escape paying any tax on sale,
but also allow tenants to gain ownership of the property.
Income-Expense Analysis
Table D-I shows a summary of the items of taxable income and taxable
expense for the Newcastle project. The two sources of income to the
partnership are the rents collected and the 236 debt service subsidy from
HUD. The rents collected allow for a 5 percent vacancy or non-payment
factor. The 236 subsidy is very nearly $65,900 each year. It is based
upor the difference between the an;'ual constant payment necessary to pay
off the mortgage over 40 years at a 72 percent interest rate plus I percent
mortgage insurance premium and that necessary to pay off the loan at 1
percent interest. The total rental income is about $222,800 per year.
Deducted from this income are the items of operation and replacements,
real estate taxes, interest and mortgage insurance premiums, and deprecia-
tion. The amount of interest and mortgage insurance deductions allowed
is the full market rate paid, rather than the 1 percent actually paid by
the project. However, because the debt service subsidy is treated as
taxable income, the net effect is a wash. The only expensed item which
is not actually paid out is the depreciation. In this case, depreciation
occurs primArily during' years 2 through 6. The items for which income is
received but which are not deductable are the amortization and the
dividend. Amortization starts accruing. slowly as it would on a loan at
8 percent interest and a 40 year term. During the first few years
amortization represents only $4000 to $5000 compared with a total debt
service payment of $104,000. On a 1 percent loan with a 40 year term the
amortization would be $12,000 to $13,000 in each of the first few years.
The only value which amortization has to the investor is a lower tax on
sale. However, this tax usually will not occur until the 20th year and
is at capital gains rates. By allowing this slow build-up of amortization,
the 236 subsidy is more costly to the Treasury than a direct loan at 1
percent interest would be.
The assumption has been made that operating expenses, real estate
taxes, and rents will remain constant for the 20 year period. Clearly, this
is an unrealistic assumption. To the extent that rents are raised to
keep pace with itcreased expenses the net effect is the same to the investor.
Rent increases are inconsequential for those tenants who are on leased
housing are covered by rent supplements or are already paying more than the
basic rent, i.e. for those tenants whose rent is based on their income.
However, tenants who pay the basic rent are likely to resist rent increases.
Project deficits are first taken out of the investors' cash dividend.
If deficits persist the developer will have to contribute cash, other-
wise the project will go into default and possibly foreclosure. The non-
payment of the cash dividend and the occurence of foreclosure represent
risks to the investors. Investors are under no obligation to provide
additional funds. Their liability is limited to the amount of their
original investment.
D-I Income-Expense Analysis
Income:
1. Gross rent
2. HUD subsidy
3. Total income
Expenses:
4. Operation &
replacements* 0
5. Real estate
taxes 34,000
6. Interest &
mortgage
insurance 0
7. Expenses frm
construction 96,000
8. Depreciation 0
9. Total expnss 130,000
10. Taxable in-
come (loss) (130,000)
77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 ,77000
33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400
100.160 99,850 99,510 99,150 98,760 98,340 97,880 97,390 96,860
301,060
511,620
300,950
511,210
300,870
510,780
300,780
510,330
(288,820) (288,400) (287,980) (287,510) (287,060)
630
209,370
13,430
50
208,850
510
208,300
460
.207,720
13,950 14,500 15,080
Allocation of Cash:
11. Amortization
12. Cash dividend --
13. Cash flow after
taxes (50%
bracket)** 65,0
14. Mortgage
balance 1,252,0
15. Depreciable
Basis 1,510,6
3,880
8,350
4,190
8,350
4,530
8,350
00 152,760 152,550 152,340
4,890
8,350
5,280
8,350
152,110 151,880
5, 700
8,350
1,640
6,160o
8,350
1,370
6,650
8,350
1,100
?,180
8,350
810
00 1,248,120 1,243,930 1,239,400 1,234,510 1,229,230 1,223,530 1,217,370 1,210,720 1,203,530
00 1,209,640 908,680 607,810 307,030 6,330 5,700 5,130
* A more sophisticated analysis would show interest accruing in a reserve fund and replacement
the year made. This refinement is irrelevant for current purposes.
** Line 12 minus 0.5 times line 10.
0
0
~0~
156,900
65,00
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65900
222,800
4,620 4,160
expenditures in
-- W
300,?00
509,860
D-I Income-Expense Analysis (Continued)
Income:
1. Gross rent
2. HUD Subsidy
3. Total income
Expenses:
4. Operation &
replaceants
5. Real estate
taxes
6. Interest &
mortgaGe
insurance
7. Expenses from
8.
9.
10.
construction
Depreciation
Total exnam
Taxable in-
come (loss)
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
65,900,
222,800
156,900
-65,900
222,800
156,900
659,00
222,800
156,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
156,900
62,900
222,800
156,900
65,900
222,800
'156,900
222,800
77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000 77,000
33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400 33,400
96,280 95,660 '94,990 94,270 93,490 92,640 91,730 90,740 89,680 88,530
420
207,100
370 370
206,430 205,?60
370 3 0 70 , 370 370
203.410 202,500 201,510 200,4?0 199,300
15,710 16,370 17,040 17,760 18,540 19,390 20,300 21,290 22,330 23,500
Allocation of Cash:
-1. Amortization
12. Dividend
13. Cash flow after
taxes (50%
bracket)
14. mortgage
Balance 1,1
15. Depreciable
7, 760
8,350
490
8,380
8,350
160
9,050
8,350
(170)
9,770 10,560
8,350 8,350
(530)
11,400
8,350
12,310
8,350
12,300 14,360
8,350 8,350
(920) (1,350) (1,800) (2,300) (2,820) (3,400)
95,780 1,187,400 1,178,350 1,168,570 1,158,020 1,146,620 1,134,310 1,121,010 1,106,650 1,091,140
3,000 2,630 2,260 1,890
15,510
8,350
370
205,040
370
204,260
780 410basis 3,740 3,370 1,520 1,150
The sum of the amount of depreciation is $1,510,200. This value
is calculated by taking the $1,391,000 total development cost shown to the
FHA, subtracting the $10,000 in land, and adding the $259,6002 in equity
which the investors are willing to provide in excess of the implied equity. 3
The excess equity is an actual out-of-pocket expense to the investors which
is a cost to the Government which is not included in official estimates
for Sec. 167(k).
The most important line to investors is line 13 (Table D-I), the
cash flow after taxes. This value is the sum of his tax savings resulting
from taxable loss and of the cash dividend payable to him. During the
first six years the after-tax cash flows are large and positive. Beginning
in the seventh year the depreciable basis has been largely used up. In most
instances depreciation of the shell of the building will continue to be
depreciated long after the depreciation of the repairs has been completed.
However, in this case, the total acquisition price of the buildings is only
$10,000. Subtracting out the value of the non-depreciable land leaves an
insignificant value for the shell. However, the excess depreciable basis
over $1,500,000 is depreciated over 20 years. The aftei-tax cash flow
after the seventh year is relatively insignificant. Beginning with the
12th year the after-tax cash flows are negative. At this point the amort-
ization has grown larger than the after-tax value of the dividend. From
this point on rehabilitated property is a liability to investors.
Tax on Sale
The usual reason why an investor would hold the property is to avoid
the large gains tax on sale. The taxable gain from sale is equal to the
difference between the sales price (including the mortgage) and the
4
adjusted basis. An Investor wishing to sell out quickly cannot expect a
45
sales price much above the mortgage. He could abandon ownership at that
point. The second and successive owners of the property can only depreciate
it using the 125 percent declining balance method over the actual useful life
of the property (about 25 years). If the remaining useful life is less
than 20 years they can only use straight-line depreciation. 5 These forms
of depreciation are the equivalent to only about 5 Tercent depreciation of
6the undepreciated balance per year. The adjusted basis of the property to
the initial owner in any year after the 6th is $10,000. This amount
represents the nondepreciable land costs. Assuming a sales price equal to
the mortCage balance, the taxable gain from sale is thus well in excess
of $1,000,000 in any year from the seventh to the twentieth. The rate
at which this gain is taxed depends upon the ordinary tax bracket of the
investor and the year of sale.
Up until the 200th month of holding the property, any taxable gain
from selling it is split between a portion taxed at ordinary income rates
and a portion taxed at capital gains rates. Capital gains rates are one-
half of ordinary rates. The portion taxed at ordinary rates is the
"excess deprce:. tion" taken over straight line depreciation computed upon
the actual useful life of the buildings. This tax is known as recapture.
Between the 100th month and 200th month the applicable percentage taxed
at ordinary income rates declines from 100 percent to 0 percent at the
rate of 1 percent per month.7 (See Fig. D-I) After the 200th month all
of the tax is at capital gains rates.
The addition of a share of the large taxable gain to the taxable income
of an investor normally in a 50 percent bracket will undoubtedly raise
his bracket to at least 60 percent. His capital gains bracket would
then be 30 percent.
As seen in Fig. D-I the tax on sale declines from a maximum of $734,000
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in year six to $327,000 in year 20. After this point the after-tax cash
losses are greater than the savings in deferring the tax.
Disposition Alternatives
Real estate tax guides provide a plethora of legal means to avoid
or defer paying gains tax on the sale of property on which substantial
depreciation has been taken. Refinancing, giving the project to a
charity, negotiating a tax free exchange, selling in installments, and
passing the property onto heirs at the time of death are the usual means
for avoiding an overburdensome gains tax. Except for the last method,
none of these methods will work after a five-year wirte off has been taken.
The Section 1039 rollover is a new alternative means of escaping taxation.
Refinancing instead of selling is prohibited by FRA until the 20th
year. Even if it were allowed it would only yield a small amount of equity.
Giving the property away, even to a charity, does not solve the problem. In
Crane v. Commissioner 221 U.S. 1, 12-13, the Supreme Court ruled that the
value of the outstanding mortgage is considered part of the sales price.
Hence, in this case, "giving" the project away at the end of 6 years would
be equivalent to selling it for the value of the outstanding mortgage at
that point, $1,229,000. The taxable gain from sale is equal to the sales
price less the adjusted basis ($1,229,000 - 16,300 - $1,212,700).9 Of this
amount $1,226,000 would be recaptured at ordinary rates of about 60 percent
and $86,300 would be taxable at capital gains rates of about 30 percent.
The total tax would be $588,200.
The value of a charitable deduction would be the difference between
the fair market value of the property and the disposition price.10 The
fair market valte is the price at which a willing seller would sell and
a willing buyer would buy in an arms' length transaction. The methods used
by appraisers to determine this price are by market comparison, by taking
original cost less depreciation, and by capitalization of income. 1 1 A
market comparison would be difficult since few 221(d)3 or 236 projects
have ever been sold. Taking the original cost less depreciation based
upon 5 percent depreciation per year would yield a value of less than the
outstanding mortgage unless the land value appreciated substantially. The
capitalization of income approach depends upon the cash flow generated
from the project, and the capitalization rate selected. Assuming that the
cash flows on the project average 3 percent of the original implied equity
or $4150 and taking a capitalization rate of 15 percent, a rate indicative
of a risky project, the fair mua:ket value would be only $27,800 above the
mortgage.
The amount of the, charitable deduction is unlikely to be more than
this amount. The not tax cost of giving the property away to a charity
to an investor normally in a 50 percent bracket is thus (588,200 -
[.60 x 27,800) - $571,500).
Another way to avoid a high gains tax in some transactions where the
basis has shrank is the tax free exchange. Here, the owner of the
depreciated property receives a second piece of property which has a
depreciable basis equal to the amount of equity the investor had built up
in the first project plus any additional cash put in, Since an investor has
little equity to trade for depreciable basis, a tax free exchange has
little value to him. The installment sale method of deferring gains tax
also has little applicability in cases of this type. This method allows
the gains tax to be paid as the buyer receives his money. However, the year
that the mortgage is transferred to the buyer is the year that the seller must
pay a tax on that portion of the sales price. If the mortgage value plus
any other payments made in that taxable year exceed 30 percent of the total
salos price, as they almost invariably will, the installment method will not
apply.12
The only sure method for an investor to dispose of the property without
being subject to a gains tax is for him to pass it on to an heir at the
time of death. The heir need pay no gains tax. He receives the property
with the basis stepped-up to the fair market value upon receipt. 1 3 Short
of dying none of the traditional escape routes are relevant. The new
Section 1039 rollover is a far more complicated matter.
Value of the Pollover to Investors
The Section 1039 rollover allows a taxpayer to pay no tax on the
disposition of a 236 or-221(d)3 project to the tenants provided that the
"net amount realized" is reinvested in another project of these types.
This advantage is mitigated by the fact that the depreciation benefits
taken on the first project are reflected in the tax on the sale of the
second project and in a reduced basis on the second project (thereby
eliminating most of the depreciation on the second project),1 4 The developer
of the second project would require a substantial capital contribution based
upon the depreciation benefits normally available to investors. The sales
price of the first project to the tenants, as will be seen is unlikely to
be much above the mortgage balance.
Closer investigation reveals several more subtle advantages and
disadvantages in a rollover in comparison with holding the first project.
The second project would generate construction expenses which are deductible
without reduction of basis. 1 5 The minimum size of the mortgage on the
second project is smaller than that on the first. For this reason and
because payments on the second mortgage are likely to begin at least six
years after payments on the first, the taxable amortization payments on
the second project will be lower than the continuing payments on the
first. The low mortgage, however, will mean lower potential cash dividends.
The investors may be able to take a small charitable deduction for giving
the first project to the tenants. They may also be able to take some new
depreciation on the second project. Their tax on the sale of the second
project 14 years later may actually be slightly higher than the tax they
would have paid on the sale of the first project at that time. Any
expenses incurred on the sale of the first project must be paid in cash
but would be deductible. As will be seen a rollover will be beneficial to
investors only in projects which look like they will fail or in projects
where refinancing is allowed.
Whether a single investor can elect the rollover of whether the part-
nership as a whole must make this decision is open to question. Section
1039(a) says that gain will be deferred "at the election of the taxpayer."
If an individual investor otherwise fulfills the requirements of 1039 he
would appear to be the appropriate "taxpayer." However, one commentator16
has suggested that since the partnership must make all elections for the
partners,17 it is the relevant "taxpayer." Certainly, regulations will
have to clarify this point.
In the case of the Newcastle project with an original mortgage of
$1,252,000 the mortgage balance at the end of the sixth year (after the
construction losses and the 5-year write-off have been taken) would be
$1,229,200 For purposes of determining the taxable gain from sale Sec.
1039(b)(4) defines the "net amount realized" on the sale of the first
project as the amount realized less the closing cost incur red. If the
sale price to the tenants were $500 above the mortgage and closing costs
were $500, the "net amount realized" would be equal to the mortgage.18
The taxable gain from this disposition will be "recognized only to the
extent that the not amounLt realized on such approved disposition exceed
the cost of such other qualified housing project."19 The "cost" of the
second project will most probably be defined by the regulations as the
amount paid in cash or other property less real estate taxes.20 In other
words the "cost" of the second project does not include those items which
axe expensed, i.e. deducted in the year that they are paid. Thus, in order
to fully defer the gains tax at this time, the investors would have to
reinvest in a project in which the "cost" of their interests, including
both the new mortgage and their capital contribution less those items which
are expensed equalled at least $1,229,200, the net amount realized. Unless
the cost of the second project was more than this amount, the basis of the
second project would be its cost reduced by an amount equal to the amount
of gain not recognized by reason of the rollover. The basis of the second
project would be equal to the adjusted basis of the first, $10,000. Find-
ing a second project of the appropriate size would be easier than it
might first appear. Investors could buy into a larger project so that
their interest after deducting the expensible items equalled the amount
of gain not recognized on the disposition of the first project.
If the partners decide to use the rollover at all, they are almost
certain to choose a new project as their second project rather than a
rehabilitation project. The capital contribution required to invest in a
rehabilitation project would equal 32 percent of the mortgage if it were
similar to the Newcastle case or as low as 19 percent if it were being
syndicated by a more conservative developer.22 The minimum capital contribu-
tion required to invest in a new project would be about 15 percent of the
mortgage.23 Investors perceive new projects to be generally less risky than
rehabilitation ones as shown by the lower rate of return they normally
expect. On a rollover where the potential depreciation benefitson the
second project are nil, the relative security of a new project is the
overriding factor. This greater security is also more likely to yield
residual value from the sale of the project. A further advantage to a
newly constructed project is that the period for phasing out of recapture
of excess depreciation occurs between the 20th and 120th month rather than
between the 100th and 200th month.24 Since the holding periods for each
project tack together,25 assuming a sale of the first project five years
after its completion, recapture at ordinary income tax rates would vanish
after only sixty months of holding the second project. This advantage,
however, would affect only those investors who shoose to sell or are forced
to sell at some point between the 20th and 200th months.
As Table E-I shows, assuming a sale to the tenants at the mortgage
balance rolling over into a new project will be disadvantageous for any
investor in any bracket using any discount rate. This example assumes a
minimum capital contribution to loan value ratio of 15 percent. The cash
cost would be $1,229,000 including a mortgage of $1,181,900 and a capital
contribution of $177,300. The closing costs are assumed to be neglegible
because they normally would consist of only paying a lawyer to record
the deed and transfer the regulatory agreement with the FHA to the buyer.26
The construction losses would be a maxiinum of $130,000 or 11 percen of the
mortgage. In actual cases they seem to run from 7 percent to 11 percent
of the mortgage.27 Taxable amortization is reduced by about $59,300
over a 14 year period. The lower 'mortgage means potentially lower cash
dividends paid out although these are taxable.
The depreciation benefits are less certain. The adjusted basis on
the first project is $16,330 at the time of the rollover. This basis
consists of $10,000 in non-depreciable land costs and $6,330 in as yet
undepreciated rehabilitation costs in excess of the $15,000 per unit limit.
The basis on the second project is "its cost reduced by an amount equal to
the amount of gain not recognized by reason of the application of sub-
section (a) Lthe rollover)'.28 When the cost of the second project equals
the net amount realized on the first, the basis of the second project would
equal the adjusted basis on the first, or $16,330 in this case. By the
statute all of this basis would then seem depreciable. However, when the
IRS writes regulations for 1039 it could keep a portion of the basis being
carried over to the second project tied to the land. An optimistic reading
of the statute would allow the new construction to be depreciated to the
extent of the basis using the double declining balance method and a 33 1/3
year useful life, i.e. at 6 percent per year of the as yet undepreciated amount.
In this case depreciation on the second project would start at zero in
the year of construction, jump to $980 in the following year, and decline
gradually to $460 by the 14th year of the second project. These amounts
compare with retaining the first project where $630 in depreciation would
be allowable in the first year of the second project and a lesser amount
would be allowable in succeeding years down to $370 in years 7 through 14.
The additional depreciation does, however, increase the taxable gain from
sale by $2,500. This tax is only at capital gains rates and occurs several
years after the rollover. The discounted net gain from the increased
depreciation in this case is $500 to an investor in a 50 percent bracket
and $800 to an investor in a 70 percent bracket.
While this benefit may be nearly insignificant in this case, it
would be important in another case where' the amount. of original land cost
now available for depreciation was $2,500-$3,000 per unit rather than $100.
Another possible benefit accruing to investors who use the 1039
rollover would be a charitable deduction on the disposition of the first
project. Taking this deduction would require that the recipient tenant
association be a charitable foundation under IRC Sec. 501(c)3. The amount
Net Gain to Investor from Rollover
Balance outstanding on original mortgage
Net amount realized
Mortgage on 2nd project
Capital contribution @ 15% mortgage
Construction expenses @ 11% mortgage
Cash cost of 2nd project
$1,229,200
1,229,200
1,181,900
177,300
1,359,200
130,000
1,229,200
Tax Consequences Project 1 Proiect 2 Difference
Project 2-Project l Present Value
@ 4%
Construction losses
(year 1)*
Depreciation**(years
1-14 weighted to
year 7)*
Amortization** (years
1-14 weighted to
year 9)*
Annual cash dividend**
(years 1-14)*
Charitable contri-
bution (year 1)*
Value to investor:
in 50, bracket
in 70p bracket
Taxable gain on sale
(year 14)*
Value to investor:
50% bracket
70% bracket
Non-Tax consequences
Annual cash dividend**
(years 0-13)*
Capital contribution
year 0) *
(year 1 *
(year 2)*
Net value to investor
in 50% bracket
in 70o bracket
130,000
3,000 5.900
(138,100) (78,800)
(4,170) (3,680)
27,800
(1,081,000) (1,083,500)
4,170 3,680
(59,100)
59,100
59,100)
130,000
2,500
59,300
490
27,800
(2,500)
(490)
(59,100)
(59,100)
(59,100)
125,000
1,900
41,900
8,700
26,800
204,300
102,200
143,000
(1,400)
(400
(500)
(8,700)
(59,100
56,900
54,700
(179,4o)
(7760)36,900
* Years refer to years of project 2. Year 1 of project 2 corresponds to
year 7 of project 1.
* No depreciation cash dividend or amortization occurs in year of
construction.
Tabl1e D-I I I
of the charitable deduction, if any is likely.to be no more than $27,800.29
All of these benefits and disbenefits must be discounted to their
present value before being summed. Since all of the positive and negative
cash flows of the first project after the fifth year of that project
are presumed to be balanced in a sinking fund at a discount rate of 4
percent, the appropriate discount rate to compare rolling over into a
second project with holding onto the first would be 4 percent. The net
result is that an investor in a 50 percent bracket would lose the discounted
equivalent to $77,600 by rolling over into a second project. An investor
in a 70 percent bracket would lose $36,900.30 It must be remembered that
this low a level of losses was achieved through some rather liberal assump-
tions. The losses would be greater if the tenant organization has not
been deemed by the IRS as a tax-deductible organization, if the IRS forbids
the depreciation of the amount allocated to the land on the first project,
or if the construction losses are a lower percentage of the mortgage. Using
more conservative assumptions would increase the discounted loss to about
$40,000 for a 50 percent bracket investor and to about $57,000 for a 70
percent investor.
Any investor who did choose to use'the rollover would have to lay out
funds to meet the first capital contribution payment before any tax
deductions accrue. This cash requirement theoretically could come out
of the sinking fund.31 Because a' tax will eventually occur on the sale,
the sinking fund will eventually have to be replenished.
In light of the costs the only reason why an investor would consider
a rollover at the mortgage balance would be to avoid foreclosure. A
foreclosure at this point would cost investors taxed at a 60 percent rate,32
$733,000. This tax is equivalent to a sale at the mortgage balance. By
comrarison using a discount rate of 4 percent the present value of the
tax on sale at the mortgage balance 14 years later would be $194,000.
Thus if a foreclosure is likely, the cost of the rollover is lower than the
tax liability of foreclosure. Still the investors must find a second
project which is safer than the first. Foreclosure of the second project
is equally as costly as foreclosure of the first.
The investors must also convince the tenants of the first project
to accept ownership. If the project is in financial trouble their
acceptance of it is questionable. When the financial trouble is accompanied
by poor maintenance, -tenant groups are unlikely to want to take over the
property unless repairs are made. The Development Corporation of America
planned Academy Homes in Roxbury to be a cooperative shortly after it was
built in the 196 0's. Because of the deteriorated condition of the buildings
arising from poor design and construction the tenants now refuse to assume
this role.33 Similarly, the tenants of the Cathedral public housing
project are eager to take over the ownership of the buildings from the
Boston Housing Authority. However, they refuse to do so until the project
is "modernized."30
For those projects that are financially stable, i.e. those projects
which are likely to be most desirable for tenants to own, another means is
needed to induce the investors to dispose of them. One way would be to
provide them with enough financial incentive to make a rollover desirable.
A tenant organization which wanted to buy the project from the investors
would have to raise approximately $80,000. These sums amount to about
$800 per family. Clearly, few projects could raise this amount from each
family. However, an alternative which may be open to the tenants is for
the FHA to refinance the project so as to provide a 100 percent non-profit
mortgage rather than the 90 percent limited-dividend mortgage. FHA Reg.
Sec. 236.40(c) reads:
In the case of a project financed with a mortgage insured under
this subpart which involves a mortgagor other than a cooperative
o. a private nonprofit corporation or association and which is
sold to a cooperative or a nonprofit corporation or association,
a mortgage given to finance the purchase may be insured under this
subpart. The amount of such mortgage shall not' exceed the
appraised value of the property at the time of purchase. Such
value shall be based upon a mortgage amount, the debt service
of which can be met from the income remaining after payment of
all operating expenses, taxes, and required reserves, and with
the project being operated on a nonprofit basis.
According to this formula the amount of equity to which the investors
would be entitled would be based upon the amount of the cash dividend they
had been earning. The rent to the tenants would remain the same. The only
change would be that whatever amount of the rents that had been going for
a dividend would be capitalized at 3.04 percent and added to the mortgage.
To capitalize the $80,000 or so necessary to make a rollover feasible in
the Newcastle case,35 the FHA formula would require the dividend to have
been (0.0304 x $80,000 - 2,400), or about 1.7 percent of the original
implied equity. If the project had been earning the full 6 percent
dividend the refinancing would yield about $275,000 above the mortgage.
The FHA, however, has been reluctant to provide additional equity
money for this purpose. No limited-dividend projects have been fully
converted to cooperatives. Projects which yield no dividend would allow
the investors no equity. However, in such cases, the investors are likely
to be willing to give the project to the tenants simply to avoid the
possibility of foreclosure.
Even if a rollover does occur, it will not alter the net cash flows to
the investors shown earlier in this chapter.
MOTNOTES
1. See pp.'68-73 infra.
2. The only depreciation not taken is $370 which would be taken in
the 21st year.
3. See pp.117-21 of Appendix infra.
4. IRC Sec. 1001, Crane v. Commissioner requires the mortgage to be included
in the sales price.
5. IRC Sec. 167(0)(5).
6. See pp. 47-48 infra. for an analysis of the fair market value of the
property.
7. Actually, the period for phasing out of recapture for 236 property
depreciated under the 167(k) 5-year method is ambiguous. IRC Sec.
1250(a)(i)(c) allows recapture to be phased-out under the pre-1969
Tax Reform Act period of the 20th to 120th months. IRC Sec. 1250(a)(1)(c)(iii) says that recapture on property depreciated under
167(k) is to be phased out beginning after the 100th month. The
100-200th month rule is generally assumed applicable.
8. See for example, Institute for Business Management, "Real Estate
Investments and How to Make Them," Feb. 1970, pp. 9-11. See also
Philip David, Urban Land Development, pp. 107-108.
9. See I.R.C. Sec. 1001.
10. I.R.C. Reg. Sec. 1.70-1(c).
11. Ratcliff, Real Estate Analysis, pp. 134-135.
12. IRC Sec. 453.
13. IRC Sec. 1014.
14. IRC Sec. 1039(d).
15. IRC Sec. 1016(a)(i)(A).
16. The Tax Lawyer, Fall 1969, v.23,p.671.
17. IRC Sec. 703(b).
18. IRC Sec. 1039(b)(4) defines the net amount realized as being equal to
the amount realized less expenses and taxes (other than income taxes)
incurred on the sale. Based upon Crane v. Commissioner, the amount
realized includes the mortgage
19. IRC Sec. 1039(a).
20. In instances where the basis equals the "cost" of the project, the
"cost" of the project is defined in this manner. See IRC Reg. Sec.
1.1012-1(a),(b).
21. IRC Sec. 1250(d)(8) deliniates a set of very complex rules which simply
mean that to the extent that the reinvestment is less than the net
amount realized the normal gains tax is applicable. Any excess
reinvestment is treated like a new investment.
22. See Practicing Law Institute, Subsidized Housing, p. 249.
23. The Practicing Law Institute, op.cit., shows a confidential memo-
randum with a contribution of 12 percent of the mortgage for an
80 percent interest in the project and one with 15 percent for an
85 percent interest (pp. 375,429). James Wallace, op.cit., Table II-1,
shows a 15 percent capital contribution to mortgage ratio with no
phasing of the payments. Marvin Gilman of Leon Weiner Builders told
a conference of the Practicing Law Institute that his firm would
accept no less than 14 percent for a 90 percent interest. Walter
Wincester of the State Street Development Corporation said at an
M.I.T. seminar on Jan. 22, 1971 that they too expect 14 percent for the
sale of 90 percent of a project.
24. IRC Sec. 1250(a)(1)(c). At the start of the holding period all
excess depreciation over straight-line based on the actual useful
life (approximately 4 percent per year on rehabilitation or 3 percent
on new construction depending upon the useful life allowed by the IRS),
is taxed or recaptured at ordinary income tax rates. At the end of
the period the tax is all at capital gains rates.
25. IRC Sec. 1250(e)(4).
26. Interview with Robert Gunderson, Lawyers for Housing.
27. Cf. Harvard Business School (p. 26,29), Practicing Law Institute
op.cit.,(p. 388,389,432,462,491,522).
28. IRC Sec. 1039(d).
29. See pp. 47-48 supra.
30. If another project with original land and shell costs of a few hundred
thousand dollars had been selected, a rollover might show a slight
positive return for a 70 percent bracket investor only. This proposition
assumes that the IRS would allow accelerated depre-Aiation in the
second project of the amount in the first project t.hat had been
allocated to non-depreciable land and a slowly-d.preciable shell.
31. See page 77 infra.
32. The taxable income from the foreclosure is likely to raise the bracket
of a 50 percent bracket investor to at least 60 percent.
33. Interview with Robert Gunderson, Boston Lawyers for Housing.
34. Peoples' South End News, May 1971, p.12.
35. A sale to the tenants for an amount in excess of the mortgage would
increase the "net amount realized." Thus, to fully defer a gains tax
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the investors would have to reinvest in a -slightly larger project than
shown in Table D-III. They would, however, be able to depreciate
this increment. They would no longer be able to receive a charitable
deduction. The net effect is that $70,000 will make a rollover feasible.
36. Roger Willcox of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing stated at
a seminar at M.I.T. on January 14, 1971, that FHA refused to convert
a large group of buildings in Roxbury to cooperatives through this
means. According to Washington attorney, Irwin Nestler, "every deal
is different." Nestler's firm has secured FHA approval to refinance
a limited dividend project in Detroit to provide a 100 percent
cooperative mortgage. This commitment required political muscle and
such legal finesse as calling equity going back to investor a "return
of the Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance that had
been previously waived."
E. THE INVESTORS
The primary purpose of this chapter is to consider how much investors
are willing and should be willing to pay for the after-tax cash flows
discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter first looks at who the
investors are. A 25 percent rate of return is taken to be the rule. Upon
evaluation of the alternative costs and the risks, particularly the risk
of foreclosure, the appropriate rate of return is found to be around 33
percent.
The capital contribution to the developer is calculated at $398,600
using a 25 percent return and $320,000 using a 33 percent return.
Description of Typical Investor *
The tax benefits are generally sold to a group of wealthy investors.
The Treasury examined the returns of several passive investors in real
estate in 1964. The Treasury found that they reported an average wage or
salary income of $140,000 and an average deduction from real estate of
$77,500, offsetting other income.2 Thus, at 1970 rates the typical investor
filing a joint return would be in a 66 percent marginal federal tax
bracket; the taxpayer would save 60 percent of the amount of the
deduction. Beginning in 1972, however, the maximum tax on earned income
will be 50 percent. Only those people receiving large amounts of
dividends, interest, or short term capital gains will pay higher.
The reason that the average invest6r is so wealthy relates not only
to the added benefits that an investor in a high tax bracket can receive,
but also to Federal Securities laws. 5 Basically, these laws protect
the interest of investors vis-a-vis the partnership. The penalties for
failure to comply with them can be extreme. Unless exempt every syndication
must be registered with the Securities Exchange Commission. Failure to
register can cause payment of damages and the recision of the transaction. 6
"Willful" violation of the Acts can lead to five years in jail and a
$5000 fine.7 The costs of registering are almost as severe as the penalties.
The legal, auditing, and printing costs can add up to $100,000; the delay
is six or seven weeks for even a small issue.8
Generally, developers and brokers will seek a private offering
exemption under Section 4(1). Under this exemption they must restrict
the number of offerees to less than 25 "sophisticated" potential investors.
"Sophistication" primarily depends upon experience and ability. Where an
offeree is extremely wealthy so that he can afford sophisticated counsel,
he too is considered sophisticated. Care must be taken so that securities
do not fall into the hands of unsophisticated investors even after the
initial sale.9
Variation from the typical investor depends to a large extent upon
how the investors are found. When a stock brokerage house locates the
investors, they are likely to be extremely wealthy as a result of
investment income. Recently when the Development Corporation of America
checked who had purchased its limited partnership interests, handled
through Kidder-Peabody, it found that virtually all were in a 70 percent
tax bracket.10 The tax shelter in the case of the Roxbury Action Program's
Rap-Up I all went to the partners in the law firm handling the case.11
When lawyers and accountants make the placement, the investors are likely
to be clients, who have an income through earnings or investments in
excess of $50,000. When members of the organization serving as the
general partner locate the limited partners, the wealthy people they
are most likely to know are doctors and dentists.
When the National Housing Partnership serves as a limited partner,
the tax losses are passed on to the nation's largest industrial firms,
insurance companies, and banks.
The structure of the transaction will also help to determine the
type of investor. When a community group is the general partner, a more
socially motivated breed of investors might be attracted. Whether this
social motivation will allow them to accept a lower rate of return, or
whether it would merely give them some after-the-fact satisfaction,
remains to be seen.
How wealthy and how sophisticated an investor is will determine the
type of transaction he will accept. The most sophisticated potential
investors, i.e. persons knowledgeable in real estate, will rarely enter
a partnership structured by anyone else, simply because they would have
enough tax shelters of their own.12 Among those investors who do enter
limited partnerships, the most sophisticated and most wealthy will be
most conscious of when payments will have to be made and received. Their
discount rate, i.e. the value they place on having money over time will
be higher than that of the typical investor. The longer they can defer
the heavy tax which occurs on the eventual sale of the property, the
better off they are.
Relatively naive investors often will check the profitability of a
transaction by adding up the cash paymehts required of them and adding up
the benefits accruing to them and compare the two sums without regard to
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when they occur. Investors in relatively low tax brackets, i.e.
approximately 50 percent, prefer guaranteed dividends more than those in
higher brackets. Such profits are taxed at only 50 percent rather than at
70 percent.
The age of the investor and the certainty of his future earnings
would determine whether he would invest in a rehabilitation tax shelter
or some other form of tax shelter. The rehabilitation tax shelter appeals
most to a high bracket investor in his mid-fifties. 1 4 Such an investor
would be able to take the profits from his investment during the first
six years and defer sale until his death. At this time his heirs would be
entitled to a step-up in basis, thus avoiding a gains tax on the depreciation
already taken.
Rate of Return to Investors
The amount a developer can ask from investors depends upon how much
an investor can receive from the Government in the form of tax shelter
less the rate of return expected by the investor. On a low income rehab-
ilitation project, investors in a 50 percent tax bracket expect, as
a rule of thumb, a 25 percent rate of return. Investors in higher or
lower brackets pay the developer the same capital contribution, but retain
from the Government a higher or lower rate of return.
The rate of return to investors has little to do with the total
amount of tax shelter available. Before the enactment of Section 167(k)
investors in rehabilitation projects received nearly 25 percent on their
money.15 Developers charge as much for limited partnership interest as
the market will bear. The amount that investors will pay depends upon
the risks they perceive in comparison to alternative investment oppor-
tunities available to them. To evaluate the appropriateness of a 25
percent after tax rate of return (or any rate of return) requires looking
at what alternative investments will yield and what the elements of risk
are.
If low income rehabilitation tax shelters were risk-free, their
return would approach that given on the safest tax-free bonds or about
4 percent. Alternatively, this amount roughly represents the impact of
inflation during normal years. Bonds, however, are more liquid than tax
shelter. While a bond can be readily traded on the stock exchange, the
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transferability of limited partnership interests is generally limited to
16avoid having the partnership be taxed as a corporation. To sell his
Interest in a project an investor must first find another buyer generally
at the cost of a discount, a commission, or considerable effort. In most
limited partnerships the general partners must unanimously approve the
substitution of a limited partner. Overall, this difference in liquidity
is worth approximately an additional 2 percent rate of return.
Risks
The rate of return afforded investors in excess of the inflation and
liquidity factors is a function of risk. Part of the risk relates to
the financial situation of the individual investor, part relates to the
will of Congress, and the bulk relates to the project itself.
Regardless of the financial success of the project, an investor must
worry about the fluctuations in his own income. His rate of return is
based upon his tax bracket. Should his income decrease significantly
during one of the first six years his tax benefits would decrease. A
drop in bracket from 50 percent to 30 percent during one of the five
years of accelerated depreciation would cost investors owning the entire
Newcastle project about $41,000. This loss would cut the rate of return to
about 20 percent. Risk on the downside during the period of maximum
depreciation is reduced to the extent that the investor is able to resell
his interest.
The bracket for any investor with income from capital may also
increase during this period to as high as 70 percent and increase the rate
of return. Some investors may be in a 70 percent tax bracket throughout
the life of the project, in which case their rate of return would be
about 50 percent, assumir- ro tax preference items. Fluctuations in tax
bracket after the sixth year have a relatively insignificant effect on
the rate of return on the project. From this. point on, the risk is in
having too high a tax bracket. The only substantial tax or tax savings
occurs in the year of sale. The large capital gain will automatically put
the investor in a high tax bracket. The present value at a 4 percent
discount rate, of the difference between the computed 30 percent capital
Pains tax and the maximum gains tax of 35 percent on the sale of the project
in the 20th year for the mortgage balance is about $3000 or the equivalent
of a 0.1 percent difference in the rate of return.
Another factor relating primarily to the taxpayer that can reduce
the effective rate of return to the investors is the minimum tax on
preference items. The 1969 Tax Reform Act places a limit on the amount of
tax shelter an investor can take.17 Accelerated depreciation from 167(k)
as well as long-term capital gains has been labeled as a tax preference
item. If the amount of the tax preference items exceeds by more than
$30,000 the amount of tax which the investor normally pays, then the
investor must pay a minimum tax in addition to his normal tax, This
minimum tax is equal to 10 percent of the excess.
Confidential memoranda to investors generally state words to the
effect of, "These projections do not include consideration for tax
preference items. Consult your tax counsel for their effect in individual
cases."18 Those projections which do show a consideration for tax preference
items, show an extreme reduction in the rate of return. One memorandum
assumes that all tax preference items are subject to the minimum tax. In
this case this assumption reduces the rate of return to an investor in a
50 percent bracket from 34 percent to a rate of return of 7 percent.19
David Judelson shows that full consideration of tax preference income
reduces the rate of return for an investor in a 50 percent bracket from
25 percent to a rate of return of 11.8 percent.20
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However, for the typical investor, the impact of the tax on tax
preference items is minimal. As seen before, the U.S. Treasury found
that the average passive investor in real estate had an earned income of
$140,000. He had an average of $77,500 in deductions in excess of real
estate income. For the Newcastle case, for the same amount of deductions
an investor would have to buy approximately a one-quarter share in the
project. In this case his total net deductions during each of the first
five years of depreciation would be about $72,000. (See Table F-I)
His tax preference items would be $56,000 in excess, depreciation. The
combination of the ordinary tax he pays and the $30,000 exemption makes
his minimum tax only about $100 in each of these five years and nothing in
all other years.
Table E-I Tax Preference Items--One-Quarter Share in Newcastle Project
a. Year span 1 2-6 7-19 20
b. Depreciation 0 75,000 100 100
c. Straight line depreciation
(20 year useful life) 0 19,000 100 100
d. Excess depreciation
(line b minus line c) 0 .56,000 0 0
e. Capital gains 0 0 0 82,000
f. Total tax preference
items(line d plus linee) 0 56,000 0 82,000
g. Earned income 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000
h. Project taxable income (33,000) (72,000) 2,000 88,000
i. Total taxable income
(line g plus line h) 107,000~ 68,000 142,000 228,000
j. Tax 53,000 25,000 60,000 110,000
k. Income subject to
minimum tax (line f
minus line j minus
$30,000) 0 1,000 0 0
1. Minimum tax
(10 percent of line k) 0 100 0 0
Another risk to the investors which is unrelated to the project is the
risk that Congress will change the existing legislation or that the IRS
will change'its existing regulations. The only way in which such changes are
at all likely to affect ongoing partnerships is in the tax consequences on
sale. Total elimination of this liability is at least as likely as any
increase in it.
Two types of risks are directly related to the project--failure to
receive the projected dividend and foreclosure. The FHA limits the cash
dividend to 6 percent of the implied equity. Since the trw equity of
investors is 32 percent of the mortgage instead of 11.11 percent of the
mortgage, the maximum dividend per year is about 2} percent of the equity
or 1* percent after taxes. The real value of the dividend rests with the
fact that the dividend is payable in 19 our of 20 of the years of the
project21 while the investors have their investment paid back after 5
years. Thus, the difference between a "6 percent" dividend and no dividend
is worth about 51 percent of the true equity after taxes. 22
Payment of at least some portion of the dividend is guaranteed in
some partnerships. The Development Corporation of America, for instance,
will subordinate up to 60 percent of the management fee it is entitled
to receive to insure that the investors receive at least an average of a
3 percent dividend.23 When a community group serves as developer and manager
the probable resolution of the conflict between paying the full dividend and
raising rents or reducing project services is in favor of the tenants. The
one advocate on the behalf of the investors in this conflict may be the FHA
or its local counterpart. Still, every dollar spent on maintenance or on
reduced rents serves the interests of the investors by reducing the chances
of foreclosure.
A developer can retain for himself a share of the dividend but only
at the expense of depriving the limited partners of a corresponding share
of the tax shelter. Section 704 of the Internal Revenue Code states that
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all items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall be allocated to
the partners in the manner described in the partnership agreement. However,
allocation of deductions will be made in accordance with the partner's
distributive share of taxable income or losses if:
the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership
agreement with respect to the partner's distributive share
of such item is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed by
this sub-title.
IRC Sec. 704(b)2
The test for whether the principal purpose is tax evasion is whether the
allocation has "'substantial economic effect' that is, whether the
allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares
of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences."
Community groups with no substantial assets will sell all or nearly
all of the tax shelter. 2 5 Wealthier developers needing some tax shelter
themselves, will generally sell only about 80 to 90 percent of the interests
in the project. In calculating the value of the capital contribution,
this paper will ass,:me that 100 percent of the profits, gains and losses
are sold to limited partners. Any portion held back has at least this
much value to the developer.
The bulk of the return to the investors comes from the U.S. Treasury.
The only effect that the project would have on these returns would be in
the event of a calamity. The important risks are whether the rehabilitation
can be successfully completed within the mortgage and equity amounts;
whether the apartments will be able to be rented up to qualified tenants;
and whether the income generated from the project will be sufficient to
keep the mortgage from being foreclosed.
The risks attendant to construction in a large measure depend upon the
skill, the financial security, the motivation and the bonding capacity of
the contractor. A highly skilled contractor is more certain to complete
the project for under the cost to which he agrees.
Where cost overruns occur as a result of unforeseen construction
difficulties or labor problems, the financial ability of the contractor
to fulfill his commitment is important. Alternatively, the general partner
might agree to meet any cost overruns not met by the contractor. The
desire to secure additional work is usually a sufficient motive for him
to finish the job within the budgeted amount. Should some calamity
occur before the construction is completed, the bond will usually protect
the contractor and the investor although project expenses will undoubtedly
increase. Contractors who have not demonstrated the ability to complete
projects are usually unable to secure sufficient bonding. Investors use
bonding capacity as a measure of skill, financial ability, and experience.26
The fact that most of the capital contribution is not payable until
the completion of construction further reduces the risk to the investor.
Of the 1840 projects which have been insured by FHA under either the 221(d)3
or 236 programs only 5 have been taken over by the FRA before the completion
of construction.27
Initial rent-up of 236 housing, unlike some unsubsidized housing, is
not a significant risk. When the interest is subsidized down to 1 percent
and the cash profit is limited, the rent charged for the apartment is certain
to be well below the market level for an equivalent unit in the area.
With the scarcity of funds available foi 236, the FHA is unlikely to
approve a project in a location which cannot be rented. Virtually every
236 project in the country has a waiting list. Deferment of a portion of
the capital contribution until after 95 percent occupancy has been obtained
reduces this risk to the investor.
One further risk to the investor results from an interagency discrepancy of
regulations. The definition of income by the.I.R.S. under 167(k) conflicts
with the one of HUD under 236. The proposed regulations on 167(k) state
that upon admission, the income of the household must be less than
150 percent of the income allowable for a household of that size in public
housing or else the investor cannot take accelerated depreciation on that
unit. The definition of income means gross income during the previous
taxable year less trade or business expenses allowed under Section 162.28
The income limitations for occupancy of a 236 project are set at
135 percent of public housing limits during the initual rent-up period.
However, the definition of income under Sec. 236 allows a $300 deduction
for each minor, a 5 percent deduction for unusual income(social security
and withholding), exclusion of unemployment compensation which does not
occur regularly, and exclusion of wages earned by someone no longer with the
household. A family can have a net income which is less than 135 percent
of public housing limits to qualify under Section 236 but still have a
gross income of more than 150 percent of public housing limits and not
qualify that unit under 167(k). Further, once the 236 project has been
fully rented, the income limits for admission increase to 90 percent of
221(d)3 limits or to 160-180 percent of public housing limits, clearly in
excess of the 150 percent limit. To avoid losing depreciation benefits,
the investor must protect against the general partners' admission of
unqualified tenants. Some investors insist upon a penalty clause to
prevent the general partner from admitting such tenants. Other partnership
agreements allow for the admission of one or more unqualified tenants. Once
a tenant has been admitted, his income can increase without restriction.29
Iivestors worry that even though the particular project may be sound,
vandalism, fires, and riots present in the neighborhood may affect their
project.30 When disasters occur which directly destroy the particular
project, the investors are largely protected. Proper insurance is compulsory
under 236. Section 1033 of the Internal Revenue Code allows an investor
to avoid any tax on the compulsory or involuntary conversion of property
as the result of destruction in whole or in part, or of condemnation.
Similar to the 1039 rollover Sec. 1033 requires the investor to reinvest
the proceeds within a two year period in a similar project. If, for example,
a property burns down, reinvestment of the insurance proceeds in similar
propety will avoid tax liability. The "similar property" can be any
real property, improved or unimproved. 3 1 The only precaution that the
investor need take is that the cost of the second project, including the
mortgages, be at least as great as the amount of taxable gain realized
from the insurance proceeds. By using the bulk of the insurance proceeds
to pay off the mortgage on the first project and the remainder to invest
in other heavily mortgaged property, the investor will defer tax liability.
The Risk of Foreclosure
The consequences of foreclosure pose the most serious threat to the
investor. The effect is the same as a sale at the mortgage balance. Should
foreclosure occur within the first five years after occupancy the investor
will lose part of the depreciation he had expected. Its occurance at
any time before the one -hundredth month will subject the investor to full
recapture of the "excess depreciation" he has taken. Its occurance at
any time between the one-hundredth and two hundredth month will subject the
investor to partial recapture of this depreciation. Table D-IV shows the
rate for a foreclosure in each year.
While the FHA is said to be reluctant to foreclose, their foreclosure
rate for moderate income, multi-family rehabilitation projects has been
quite high. 3 2 As of June 30, 1970, under the 236 program no foreclosures
had occurred out of 39 rehabilitation mortgages and 3073 dwelling uxnits. 3
However, under the 221(d)3 program (the predecessor to the 236) the FHA
had foreclosed upon or taken in lieu of foreclosure 18 of 172 rehabilitation
projects representing 955 out of 12,277 dwelling units. The combined
foreclosure rate for both programs has thus been 6.2 percent based upon
dwelling units. Many of the mortgages still in force have only been in
existence for 1 or 2 years. The 221(d)3 program is only 10 years old; the
236 program is only 3 years old. Projecting the foreclosure rate over a
10 year period for each project would increase the rate to 22.7 percent.
All of these foreclosures have occurred in Chicago, Washington, D.C., or
Roxbury. How many of these are the result of a calamity or involuntary
conversion is not known. For new construction no foreclosures had occurred
out of 284 mortgages and 58,199 dwelling units under the 236 program, and
only 20 foreclosures out of 1184 projects (2848 out of 146,880 dwelling
units) under the 221(d)3 program. The total foreclosure rate for new
construction has thus been 1.4 percent based upon dwelling units. The total
break-down of foreclosures between non-profits, cooperatives, and limited
dividends has been roughly proportional to the total number of projects
in each category.
The tax consequences of a foreclosure combined withits high incidence
in rehabilitation projects poses severe risks to the investor. Table E-II
shows the probability of a foreclosure in a given year and the overall
rate of return accruing to an investor if a foreclosure does occur in a
given year. The weighted average rate of return is only 4.4 percent
allowing for foreclosures compared with 25 percent disregarding them.
This rate is barely enough to compensate investors for the effect of
inflation let alone their loss of liquidity, risks on the cash flow, and
risks of a drop in bracket and change in laws.
Table E-II Effective Rate of Return to Investor in FHA-Insured
Multifamily Rehabilitation Projects Assuming Projected
Return of 25 Percent
A
n Units insured
(year) for at least
n yearsi
1 11,600
2 ?,300
3 4,700
4 3,500
5 2,800
6 2,200
? 1,800
8 1,400
9 1,000
0 700
B
Units
foreclosed
by year2
184
225
54
81
.143
200
32
0
0
0
C .
Probability
of fore-
closure in
year n*
.016
.031
.011
*023
.050
.089
.. 018
0
0
0
D
Rate of
return if
fore closu 
in year n**
-. 50
-1.50
-1.40
- .80
-. 50
-. 35
-. 25
-. 15
-. 05
.05
E
Effective
rate of
return***
-. 01
-. 05
-. 02
-. 02
-. 03
- .03
-. 00
0
0
0
Projects earning maximum return
Total .762 .25
* Column B divided by column A
** Computed by discounting capital contributions and cash flows on
Newcastle Project at various rates until their present values are equal
*** Column C multiplied by column D
1. The total number of rehabilitation units is taken from the U.S.
Department of HUD "0-2" forms through July 31, 1970 for 236 and 221(d)3
projects. The distribution of rehabilitation units per year has been
assumed to be proportional to the total number of units insured by
year in these progras as supplied by the FHA Bureau of Research and
Statistics
2. FHA Bureau of Research and Statistics.
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The one possibility for profit to the investors which is not
included as part of the rate of return is the proceeds from the eventual
resale of the project. Generally thei'sales price is assumed to be only
$1 over the outstanding mortgage./ The value of the project to another
buyer is limited by the fact that 125 percent declining balance is the most
accelerated method of depreciation available on used property and by the
fact that FHA limits dividends to 0.667 percent of the original mortgage.
As 'seen previously, realtors generally estimate a fair sales price on a
reasonably risky property by multiplying six times the pre-tax dividend
generated by the property and adding the product to the value of the
outstanding mortgage. If the project were earning the maximum dividend,
the estimated sales price would thus be only 4 percent of the original mort-
gage plus transfer of the outstanding mortgage. Even if this amount does
materialize, the duration of 20 years makes its present value insignificant.
The only instance when the residuals would be significant would be
if the value of the land appreciated considerably and the FHA allowed the
project to be refinanced. Such occurences are highly unlikely given the
areas where rehabilitation generally occurs. Most limited partnerships
provide for the reduction of the limited partners' shares in the residual
to about 50 percent of their pre-sale shares to reduce the profit to the
investors in such a case.
If the record of syndicated rehabilitation projects conforms to that
of previous projects in terms of the incidence of foreclosures and of other
elements of risk, then the rate of return demanded by investors as a rule
of thumb should climb. Assuming that a 25 percent rate of return is
sufficient compensation for the risk of foreclosure and the effects of
inflation, then added to this amount should be about 3 percent for the risk
of a smaller cash dividend, another 2 percent for the loss of liquidity, and
approximately another 3 percent for the other assorted risks. A total rate
of return of 'about 33 percent would thus seem appropriate.
Even with the rule of thumb being a 25 percent rate of return, investors
demand a considerably higher rate on projects they perceive as being
relatively risky. Investors look to an established developer, general
partner, and management agent as signs of a secure project. These groups
have reputations to protect. The Roxbury Action Program (RAP), a tenant-
oriented group, had no experience as the developer and general partner
in RAP-UP I. They are delegating the management to the tenants. Con-
sequently, investors demanded and received a 49.7 percent rate of return
on that project.34
Developers with substantial assets often make implicit guarantees
against foreclosure by holding a high percentage of the partnership
interests for themselves. Investors know that a developer who must suffer
from recapture on a foreclosure will find it in his self interest to
put in a considerable amount to keep the project alive.
The Emergency Tenants Council (ETC), an organization without sub-
stantial assets, is serving as developer and manager of their first
project. By making the contractor a general partner and by providing
certain guarantees, ETC has been able to make the project appear secure
enough that investors will take only a 26 percent rate of. return. The
general partners have agreed to hold $70,000 of the syndication proceeds
in escrow to guard against operational losses. Upon payout of more than
$4O,000 of this amount, ETC forfeits its right as property manager and the
contractor can appoint a new management agent. The general partners have
further guaranteed the completion of construction and have agreed to
refund the capital contributions if construction is not completed within
a specified length of time.
Amount of Capital Contribution
Calculation of the maximum capital contribution by the investors for
a given rate of return requires a sophisticated knowledge of how investors
think as well as what the IRS will allow. Generally, investors will not
discount the losses that occur in the later years at the same rate as they
expect to receive profit. While investors may be able to invest in other
ventures and earn a 25 percent or higher rate of return, they cannot do
so without incurring new risks. They can, however, expect to earn a
certain amount over time without risk. The after-tax rate of return to
an investor (assumed to be in a 50 percent tax bracket) on the safest
tax-free bonds is about 4 percent. Sophisticated brokers and developers
assume that investors can put a portion of their early earnings aside in
a sinking fund which will grow with accumulated interest to be exactly
large enough to pay for the losses in the later years. The effect of
assuming a sinking fund with interest at 4 percent as compared with
assuming that no interest will be earned during this period increases
the capital contribution by about 20 percent.35
Another means of increasing the capital contribution is to phase
the payments coming to the developer and make him assume some of the risk.
Thus, rather than ask for the entire capital contribution at the time the
investor agrees to join the partnership, a sophisticated developer will
accept only one-third of it then, one-third at the completion of construction
assumed to be about a year later, and one-third upon the renting of at
least 95 percent of the units assumed to be still another year later.
This type of phasing reduces the investor's risks at two key points. In
the meantime the investors can put their money to use elsewhere. Assuming
a 25 percent rate of return to the investors, phasing the capital contri-
bution over three payments will increase the capital contribution by 23 percent.
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The calculated value of the capital contribution using a 25 percent
rate of return is $398,600.36 The contribution is phased over two years
including three payments of $132,900 each. The capital contribution thus
equals about 32 percent of the mortgage. Based upon a 33 percent rate
to the investor the capital contribution would be about $320,0CD or about
25 percent of the mortgage, phased over two years.
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F. DEVELOPERS PROFIT
This chapter determines the profit which the developer of the
Newcastle project would receive. The various project expenses are sub-
tracted from the syndication proceeds to determine the net amount receivable
by the developer. To determine the appropriateness of this level of profit,
a comparison is made with the profits possible from a 236 new construction
project.
Not to the Developer
The primary expenses entailed by a developer which are not provided
for in the mortgage are the project equity, the syndication broker's
fee, the contractor's profit, and an amount to make the project operational.
While the full project equity is equal to 10 percent of the total develop-
stent costs or $139,100 in this case, most of this amount is met by the
Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance (BSPRA). This allow-
ance is valued at 10 percent of all costs other than land. In the Newcastle
case it is worth $126,000. Thus, the total cash equity required in this
case is only the $13,000 difference between the full equity and the BSPRA.
The syndication broker's fee is gen'erally approximately 20 percent
of the full capital contribution, payable as the payments are made by the
investors. Their fee includes legal, accounting, and at times real estate
appraisal fees.1
Contractors on 236 rehabilitation projects generally receive a
profit of about 8 percent of the construction costs.2 This amount is
in addition to the 2 percent overhead included in the mortgage. In the
present case a developer would have to pay the contractor about $80,000.
The amount to make the project operational may or may not have to be paid.
This amount is the cost of all operation expenses incurred prior to full
occupancy. It may include certain financing fees not included in the mort-
gage. A non-profit sponsor is allowed to add 2 percent to the mortgage in
consideration of these costs. Two percent of the Newcastle mortgage would
cost its developers $33,800. The total -discounted net compensation to
the developer is thus $193,000. (See Table F-I)
The developer's profit is likely to be subject to taxation. However,
that portion of the fee used for project-related items such as overhead
and salaries, would escape taxation. A non-profit corporate developer with
tax-exempt status under IRC Sec. 501(c)3 may be able to avoid taxation
entirely. It must show that the generation of the syndication proceeds
is related to the charitable purpose of the organisation and that the use
to which the money is put is a charitable one.3 Regardless of the accept-
ability of these arguments, the developer's fee on most projects will be
taxable. Assuming a tax at one-half of corporate rates, i.e. at 24
percent, would cut the after-tax, discounted profit to $146,600. This
return is more a compensation for services rendered than a return on
equity capital, although the equity risks are significant.
Based upon the rate of return to the investor found to be most comensurate
with his risks, 33 percent, the net to the developer would be considerably
reduced. As seen before the capital contribution would be $320,000. The
not to the developer would then be $132,500 before taxes or $100,700
after taxes. (Table F-I)
The developer must maintain his owi or another general partner's
net worth at 15 percent of the total value of the capital contributions
made by the investors.4 Otherwise the IRS could rule that the general
partner is a dummy and that the limited partnership be taxed as a corporation.
While this is only a "safe harbor" rule, lawyers for the limited partners
insist that it be followed. In no way does the rule limit the amount of
Table F-I Net Benefits to the Developer - Rehabilitation
Mortgage - 1,252,000 At 25% to Investor
Amount Present
Value @4%
At 33% to Investor
Amount Present
Value @4%
- Capital Contribution
Payment 1
Payment 2
Payment 3
BSPRA *
Project Equity
Broker's Fee
Payment 1
Payment 2
Payment 3
126,000 121,100
(139,000)
(26,600)
26,600)
26,600)
(133,800)
(26,600)
(25,600)
(24,600)
126,000 121,100
(139,000)
(21,300)
21,400)
21,300)
(138,800)
21,300)
20,400)
19,700)
Contractor's Profit
AMPO **
Net Profit before Taxes
Tax @ 24%
Net Profit after Taxes
(80,000) (76,900)
(25,000) (24,200)
193,000
46,400
146,600
(80,000) (76,900)
(25,000) (24,200)
132,500
31,800
100,700
* Builders and Sponsors Profit and Risk Allowance
** Amount to Make Project Operational
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132,900
132,900
132,900
132,900
127,800
122,900
106,600
106,700
106,600
106,600
102,500
98,600
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profit accruing to the developer but it does limit the amount of profit
which can bd spent by an impecunious developer.
Comparison with New Construction
Virtually from the start of the 236 program the demand for funds by
developers has far exceeded their supply. The waiting list for these funds
is several months in almost every part of the country. No evidence exists
that Congress has expanded or will expand the supply of 236 funds because
of the enactment of 167(k). Rather, Congress understood 167(k) to work
with conventional financing.5 Allocations of 236 funds depend more on
fiscal and political considerations than they do on the demand by developers
for funds.
Prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act the FHA had financed only 214
rehabilitation projects compared with 1466 new projects under Section
221(d)3 or 236. Of the rehabilitation projects 122 were done by non-profit
sponsors and 28 were done as a result of the special processing and other
incentives provided by the Boston Rehabilitation Program (BURP). 6 The
extent to which the increased profit available on rehabilitation projects
will increase the proportion of units rehabilitated under the 236 program
depends upon the relative profitability of rehabilitation compared with
new construction,
Given the same developmental costs on a 236 new construction project
and on a 236 rehabilitation project, the only components of the net profit
to the developer which would differ on the two would be the capital contri-
bution, the broker's fee, and the contractors profit. A sophisticated
developer is likely to receive 18 percent of the mortgage, or $234,700,
as a capital contribution were he to sell 100 percent of the interests
7Ain the project. The broker would keep 20 percent of this amount, or $79,800.
Net Benefits to the Developer - New Construction
Mortgage i 1,252,000
Capital Contribution
Payment 1
Payment 2
Payment 3
BSPRA *
Project Equity
Broker's Fee
Payment 1
Payment 2
Payment 3
Contractor's Profit
APO**
Net Profit before Taxes
Tax @ 24%
Net Profit after Taxes
Amount
78,200
78,200
78,300
126,000
(139,000)
15,600)
15,600)
15,700
(50o,000)
(25,000)
Present
Value @4%
78,200
75,200
72,500
121,100
(133,800)
(15,600
15,000
14,500
(48,100)
(24,200)
95,8003000
72,800
* Builders and Sponsors Profit and Risk Allowance
** Amount to Make Project Operational
Table F-II
The return to the contractor is generally higher on rehabilitation
projects than on new construction. Contractors generally expect only 5
percent profit plus 2 percent overhead on 236 new construction compared
with 8 percent and 2 percent on rehabilitation. 8 The general overhead
expense is a cost certified part of the mortgagel the profit comes out of thO
Builders and Sponsors Profit and Risk Allowance otherwise going to the
developer. In the Newcastle case where construction costs are $1,000,000
the difference between paying the contractor an 8 percent profit and pay-
ing him 5 percent is $30,000 to the developer.
Certainly the risks to the contractor on a rehabilitation job are
greater. Virtually every commentator on the rehabilitation process has
cited the fact that costs cannot be accurately estimated until after the
work has begun and walls and floors have been removed.9 Generally the
profit is based upon the estimated cost of the project but the contractor
often must bear the risk of meeting any cost overruns. Another factor
making rehabilitation more risky than new construction is the level of
skill required by the work force. The level of tolerance to fit new
pieces onto old sections is much lower. A further problem for the contractor
is the fact that the size of the job is likely to be smaller on rehab-
ilitation than new construction and the work sites more dispersed. For
all of these reasons most large contracting companies have avoided
rehabilitation jobs.
Summing all of the benefits and disbenefits to the developer yields
a net profit before taxes of $95,800 (See Table F-II). This amount compares
with $193,000 or $132,500 available on rehabilitation depending upon the
return to the investor. In other words, rehabilitation is either 2.0
or 1.4 times as profitable as new construction for the same size project.
Still, for the same amount of effort a developer can generally develop
more units of new construction requiring higher costs per unit. In most
cities vacant land can be assembled more readily than clusters of buildings
of a similar type and in a similar state of disrepair. The amount of
profit a developer receives is a function of the size of the mortgage. The
average 236 rehabilitation project has had 79 units and a mortgage of
$1,167,500 ($14,820 per unit). The average 236 new construction project
has had 132 units and a mortgage of $1,977,700 ($15,030 per unit). In
those cities where 236 rehabilitation has occured the average new con-
struction project has had 151 units and a mortgage of $2,599,000 ($17,200
per unit). 1 0 Thus, the average new project has had a mortgage 1.7 times
as great as the average new construction project. Those new projects in
cities with rehabilitation activity have had mortgages 2.2 times as great
as on rehabilitation.
The amount of administrative processing time and effort is similar
for any FHA multifamily project regardless of its size. Robert Whittlesey
estimated that administrative costs to obtain a $50,000 mortgage have
been as high as $12,900.11 Only a slight amount more administrative time
and money could have led to the construction of several hundred units
of new construction. Regardless of the size of the project the same steps
have to be traced through the various governmental agencies and the same
delays occur.
From the foregoing analysis more developers are certainly going to be
attracted to rehabilitation. The popularity of the new Project Rehab-
ilitation program would substantiate thig claim. However, the profit
to the developer of the typical new 2?6 project is still likely to be
greater than that on the typical 236 rehabilitation. The factor of 2.2
for the differential in size between the two types of projects within the same
set of cities is greater than both the factors of 2.0 and 1.4 for the
differential in profit on equivalent size projects using different
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assumptions for the rate of return to investors in rehabilitation.
FOOTNOTES
1. According to the experience of William McGuire of the Duke Power Company,
brokers charge a minimum of 10 percent (seminar at Harvard Business
School). Kendall Lutes of the Wall St. brokerage firm, Kendall Lutes
Lutes & Co. stated that the fee is 20 percent (conference of the
Practicing Law Institute). Roger Evans of the Law firm, Ropes &
Grey, claims that the usual fee is 33 percent.
2. Interview with Roger Evans, Ropes and Grey.
3. See Judelson, op.cit., pp. 91-99.
4. The Tax Lawyer, p. 666.
5. See p.37, note 7 supra.
6. U.S. Department of HUD, "0-2" Forms, through July 31, 1970.
7. See p.51 supra.
8. Interview with Roger Evans, Ropes & Grey.
9. See statement of Professor Davenport during the hearings on 167(k)
p. 4903; U.S. President's Committee on Urban Housing; A Decent Home,
p. 108. Milton Young, letter, pp. 11-12, quoting letter of former
Secretary Robert Weaver to the Senate Committee on Baring and Currency;
interview with Lawrence Smith, United Community Development, Inc.
10. U.S. Department of HUD, "0-2" forms, through July 31, 1970.
-1. The South End Row House, p.p. 5-12.
G, COST TO THE TREASURY
Thus far this thesis has shown that the five-year write-off has costly
elements. Section 167(k) has been seen to only be feasible in conjunction
with a subsidized mortgage, generally under the 236 program. The tax
incentive brings in securities brokers who demand a sizable profit.
Investors in 50 percent tax brackets demand and receive a 25 percent rate
of return. This chapter will add up these and other costs to the Government
so that comparison can be made between various elements between rehabilitation
and new construction and between alternative systems.
Cost of Tax Shelter
The total discounted tax revenue foregone is the sum of the tax
savings each year to the investors. This amount, of course, depends upon
the average tax bracket of the investors. While 50 percent is the marginal
tax bracket at which the market is geared, investors can be in higher
brackets. Securities laws and the inability to earn a high return preclude
investors in lower brackets. Beginning in 1972 the maximum tax on earned
income will be 50 percent. Most people who are capital wealthy pay most of
their taxes in the form of capital gains. Approximately 80 percent of the
clients of Boston Financial Technology Group, a firm marketing housing
tax shelters exclusively, are earned-income wealthy. They account for
60-65 percent of the dollar volume* Assuming that the other 35-40 percent
of the investments are made by investors in a tax bracket which enables
them to deduct 60 percent of the value of the losses from a project,1 the
average tax bracket is about 54 percent.
The appropriate discount rate for the Government depends upon the type
of analysis being made. For purposes of comparing the tax route with more
direct systems of finance, the interest which must be paid to obtain funds
directly is the appropriate discount rate. The Treasury can sell bonds at
about 6 percent and collect a tax on the interest it pays out. Including
the taxes receivable on interest, the alternative cost to the Treasury is
about 4 percent. For purposes of determining whether the tax incentive is
appropriate at all, the cost of taking money out of the private sector is
the appropriate discount rate. Economists generally suggest that this
rate is between 8 and 10 percent.2
As Table C-I shows, the total discounted tax revenue foregone by the
Treasury is really insensitive to the discount rate used, at least within
the range of 4 to 10 percent. Using a- 4 percent discount rate the total
discounted tax revenue foregone is $561,000 or 44.8 percent of the mortgage;
using a 10 percent rate the total is $544,000 or 43.4 percent of the
mortgage.
Eventually, this money 'is divided between the developer, broker, and
investor. The Federal Government does collect a tax from the developer
and broker on their net profit. Salaries and other project expenses should
out the tax on the developer's fee from the maximum of 48 percent to about
24 percent and yield a tax of $76,500 over a 3 year period. Legal, accounting,
and other fees and salaries should cut the broker's fee by about the same
amount. The broker's tax is $19,100 over a 3 year period. Using a 4
percent discount rate the net cost to the Government in foregone tax
revenues is $465,400. Using a 10 percent rate the net cost is $456,600.
The argument is often made that if the low income housing tax shelters
were plugged up investors would simbly transfer their funds to one of the
other tax loopholes, such as cattle, boxcars, and oil. 3 If investors did
behave in this manner, the Government would not collect any more taxes
by repealing 167(k). Certainly this argument is true in part. Yet
investors have a far broader choice of investments than simply other tax
G-I Discounted Taxes from Project Cash Flows
A
Year Taxable Income
1
2
3
4
5 .
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Sale
(130,000)
(288,800)
(288,400)
(288,000)
(287,500)
(287,100)
13,400
14,000
14,500
15,100
15,700
16,400
17,000
17,800
18,500
19,400
20,300
- 21,300
22,300
23,500
1,090,700
Bracket Discount
04%
0.54 .962
0.54 .925
0.54 .889
0.54 .855
0.54 .822
0.54 .790
0.54 .760
0.54 .731
0.54 .703
0.54 .676
0.54 .650
0.54 .625
0.54 .601
0.54 .577
0.54 .555
0.54 .534
0.54 .513
0.54 .494
0.54 .475
0.54 .456
0.32 .456
D
Discounted
Tax 4%*
(67,500)
(144,000)
(138,000)
(129,500)
(127,500)
(122,500)
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
161,000
(561,000)
E
Discount
@ 10%
.909
.826
*751
*683
.621
.564
* 513
.467
.424
.386
.350
.319
.290
.263
.239
.218
.198
-180
.164
.149
.149
times column B times column C
times column B times column E
F
Discounted
Tax @10%**
(64,000)
(129,000)
(11?,000)
(106,000)
(96,500)
(87,500)
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
0
0
0
0
0
0
52,000
(544,000)
* Column D equals column A
** Column F equals column A
shelters. People who do invest in low income housing are generally not
particularly interested in tax shelters. They want a high rate of return
for a given level of risk.
The amount of waste in the Government costs is divided in pieces. Out
of the foregone tax revenues comes the developers profit of $146,600. As
seen in the previous chapter this level of incentive is required to make the
returns on the typical rehabilitation project equal to those on the typical
neiw project. The $291,200 going to the investors is, on balance, largely
costless to the Treasury. In the event of a foreclosure the Treasury
collects a substantial tax from the investors. As seen previously the not
return to investors in a 50 percent tax bracket in light of the incidence
of foreclosures is only 4.4 percent or just slightly above the Government's
discount rate.5 The only portion of this amount which is excessive for the
Treasury is the difference between the return given the marginal investor
in a 50 percent bracket and the average investor in a 54 percent bracket.
This discrepancy would cost the Treasury about $42,000 on this project.
The other item of waste to the Treasury is the $40,200 going to the
broker after taxes. The broker's role is solely dependent upon the fact that
the equity financing comes from investors rather than from the Government it-
self. Through fully disclosing risks to investors, brokers often force devel-
opers of risky projects to provide guarantees against foreclosure. In other
cases they require guarantees of the cash flow which can have the effect
of deferring maintenance and thereby of increasing the possibility of
foreclosure. Any reduction in the rate of foreclosure has the effect of
reducing the possibility of the Treasury recapturing the excess depreciation
taken; any increase in the rate of foreclosure helps the Treasury but hurts
FHA.
The amount of excessive tax revenue foregone is thus the $42,000 going
to investors in greater than a 50 percent bracket and the $40,200 going to
the broker of a total of $82,200. To the extent that investors would other-
wise have invested in a different tax shelter, this amount is reduced.
Other Project Costs
The project does, however, incur costs to the Treasury other than
foregone tax revenue. The biggest of these costs is the interest subsidy.
The present value of this subsidy at a 4 percent discount rate is a maximum
of $1,254,700 or slightly more than the $1,252,000 mortgage it is helping
to pay off. This anomaly results from the fact that the subsidized difference
between the constant debt service rate on an 8 percent interest rate loan
(where the constant over 40 years is 8.31 percent) and on a 1 percent rate
loan (where the constant is 3.04 percent) is 5.27 percent. Were the Treasury
to borrow the mortgage amount directly and not charge the tenants any amount
for debt service, the subsidy would be only 5.04 percent per year. Were it
to borrow the mortgage amount directly and charge tenants the same as it
does now, the Government would save the difference between the 5.27 percent
it pays now and the (5.04 - 3.04 - ) 2.00 percent it would otherwise pay or
a net savings of 3.27 percent. This savings represents $40,900 per year for
40 years or $778,000 discounted to the present at the rate of 4 percent
per year.6 This inefficiency, by itself, dwarfs all others.
Another expense to the Government is the leased housing or rent
supplements. These programs reduce the rents for a portion of the tenants
to approximately 25 percent of their income. Assuming that 20 percent of
the tenants in the project receive one of these subsidies and that their
average income is $3000 (yeilding a rent of $62.50 per month) the Government
subsidy would be $18,000 per year or when discounted over 40 years, $356,300.7
As project expenses go up this cost may increase. All of this subsidy
goes directly toward paying real project costs.
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Table G-II Analysis of Project Cash Flows Discounted at 4%
On this particular project, the urban renewal write-down is another
Governmental 'subsidy going directly into the project. Assuming that the
market value of the land and unrehabilitated structure was $100,000, the amount
of the subsidy would be $90,000. Of this amount $60,000 would be borne by
the Federal Government and $30,000 by the Local Government. The one
amount which the Federal Government receives back from the project is
$35,000 as a financing fee.
The total discounted cost of the project to the Government using a
4 percent rate is thus $2,132,300. Of this amount over $900,000 represents
dollars which could be saved through an efficient subsidy mechanism. These
figures compare with a mortgage of $1,252,000 and an FHA approved total
development cost of $1,391,000.
Comparison with New Construction
As seen in the previous chapter, the profitability of a typical
rehabilitation project is not sufficient to divert developers from 236
new construction despite the fact that profits are up to twice as great
on projects of equivalent size. The encouragement of rehabilitation does
produce standard dwelling units at a lower price per unit, $15,030 as
compared with $17,200. The difference in the 236 interest subsidy has a
present value of $2170. The difference in rent from the lower mortgage
is $6.50. These values compare with a difference in tax subsidy of only
44.8 percent of the difference in the mortgage or about $900.9
Much of the cost difference between a unit of new construction and a
unit of rehabilitation is likely to be eliminated as the demand for
rehabilitatable shells increases. Since the supply of such shells is
very nearly fixed, any increase in demand will increase their price and hence
the 236 subsidy required. 1 0 Any final determination of the merits of encouraging
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rehabilitation as compared with new construction must also consider the
useful lives of the finished products and the relative social benefits and
disbenefits. These considerations axe left to the reader,
FOOTNOTES
1. 60 % was the average level of deduction for passive investors in a study
conducted by the U.S. Treasury. See p. 61 ur. .
2. William Baumol, "On the Discount Rate for Public Projects", in U.S.
Congrese, The PPB, p. 491.
3. For example, see Yoskowitz, "New Construction and Tax Incentives," p. 25.
4. Harold Howell, Boston Financial Technology Group and Emil Sunley,
economist for the Department of the Treasury.
5. 'See p. 73 supra. If the rate of return to investors should increase
as might be expected from an analysis of the risk factors the taxable
capital contributions would be reduced and the net average return to
investors would become greater than the cost of money to the Government.
6. This value is discounted to the year construction begins. The cost of
the subsidy in the year amortization begins is $1,304,300.
7. Rent supplements under Sec. 101 of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965, 12 U.S.C. 1701s, provides supplements for 40 years.
The Section 10(c) leased housing program (U.S. Housing Act of 1937)
also provides a 40 year subsidy. The Section 23 program (U.S. Housing
Act) provides up to 20 years of subsidy.
8. The subsidy has a present value almost identical to the mortgage
differences as seen on p. 95 supra.
9. See p. 92 supra..
10. The price of shells will increase to the limit where the shell price
plus the rehabilitation costs produce mortgage costs such that the rents
are up to the maximums allowed by FHA. Such is already the case for
new construction in high cost areas. The pricesof other factors in
the rehabilitation process such as labor are not likely to rise to
the extent they a r~ simply diverted from new construction.
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H. GOVERNMENT ALTERNATIVES-
Suggestions to Improve the Developer Incentive Mechanism1
As has been seen, the 5-year writeoff has inefficient elements. The
question remaining is what form of incentive would be better. Several
people have suggested alternatives. Ralph Taylor of Mid-City Developers in
Washington, D.C. is lobbying for several sweeteners to the existing shelter.
Professor Stanley Surrey has advocated that a tax credit system is generally a
more efficient form of providing tax shelter, although a direct system would
be most preferable. Professor Charles Haar has suggested that HUD buy the
tax shelter from the Developer. James Wallace suggests that either the
developer be paid more in cash or that the mortgage be increased along with
a deeper subsidy. Emil Sunley of the Department of the Treasury suggests
that the Government play the role of the developer but contract out the
rehabilitation work and sell the buildings upon completion. 2 These
suggestions will be examined in turn.
The specific suggestions of Ralph Taylor are: 1) to provide that capital
gain on the sale of such property be taxed at 25 percent rather than at
25-35 percent, 2) to provide that such capital gains not reduce the amount
of capital gain an individual can take within the $50,000 limit of Section
1201(d), 3) to exempt such accelerated depreciation as a tax preference
item, and 4) to entirely eliminate recapture of accelerated depreciation
taken on low income property. The primary effect of these changes,
especially the first three would be to allow wealthy investors to drain more
tax benefits from the Treasury without affecting the incentives to
developers to rehabilitate housing. The syndication price is based upon
the rate of return which is received by the investor in a marginal tax
bracket, i.e. a 50 percent bracket. Most confidential memoranda to investors
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already assume that the tax on sale for the marginal investor is 25 percent
and the investors are unaffected by the $50,000 capital gain limit. They
further assume that the minimum tax preference tax on accelerated depreciation
does not apply to the marginal investor. The effect of eliminating
recapture would be to reduce the cost of a foreclosure before the 200th
month. This change would reduce the consequences of a risk faced by all
investors. Hence it would lead to their being willing to pay developers
more for the right to be a limited partner. As has been seen, the incentives
are already more than sufficient to attract developers to rehabilitate
housing for low income families.
A slight variation to this proposal would be to eliminate recapture
of accelerated depreciation only on the sale of the project to the tenants.
This variation is discussed later in this chapter.
A tax credit system has more to offer in terms of Governmental policy.
It would attack the regressivity of tax shelters. Presently, on a $10,000
deduction a taxpayer in a 30 percent bracket saves $3,000 in taxes; a tax-
payer in a 50 percent bracket saves $5,000; and a taxpayer in a 70 percent
bracket saves $7,000. On a rehabilitation tax. shelter where the rate of
return to an investor in a 50 percent bracket is 25 percent, the return to an
investor in a 30 percent bracket would only be about 3 percent; and the
return to an investor in a 70 percent bracket would be about 50 percent.
Tax credits would allow any taxpayer, regardless of his bracket, to credit
against the tax he would otherwise pay a fixed percentage of the deduction.
If the rate were set at 50 percent, for example, taxpayers in a 50 percent
bracket would receive exactly the same tax benefits for the same amount
of depreciation as under the present system. A 70 percent bracket investor
would be limited to the same deductions as the 50 percent bracket investor.
Persons in a bracket lower than 50 percent would be able to receive as great
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of a tax shelter as anyone. With the average investor being in a 54 percent
bracket, a tax credit system would save 7 to 8 percent of the anticipated
tax losses or about $40,000 on the Newcastle project.
A tax credit system would allow investors to accept a slightly lower
rate of return since it would eliminate the risk that their tax bracket
might drop.
Adjusting the rate of tax credits would be an efficient means to
regulate the amount the developer receives. Investors demand virtually
the same rate of return regardless of the amount being passed through to
the developer. If the incentives were found to be insufficient to produce
the desired level of rehabilitation, Congress could set the value of the
tax credit at, say, 60 percent. If the incentives were found to be too
great, the tax credit value could be set at, say, 40 percent. The revenue
losses or gains from such adjustments would vary very nearly directly with
the rate set.
A tax credit system, however, would not open tax shelters to investors
in tax brackets much under 50 percent without a concomitant loosening of
securities laws. Developers must register any limited partnership with the
Securities Exchange Commission unless they obtain an exemption. 3 The cost
of registering even a small transaction with the SEC is several thousand
dollars and several weeks of delay. The usual way to avoid registration is
to sell limited partnership interest to a small number of "sophisticated"
investors. Any investor who is sufficiently wealthy to afford competent
tax counsel is considered "sophisticated." Presumably, most investors in a
bracket less than 50 percent would not be "sophisticated." 4
The suggestion that HUD "buy the depreciation" tries to bypass the
investor market. By "buying the depreciation," HUD would increase the
developer's fee and the IRS would allow no depreciation on the project.
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Presumably the only sales of limited partnership interests which would
then be made on the open market would be those being sold at a price higher
than HUD would be willing to pay. Such sales would either be made to
investors in a bracket that is higher than 50 percent who would benefit
from the tax shelter more than a 50 percent bracket investor or be made
to an investor buying a relatively secure tax shelter.
Most developers, particularly, community organization-developers, would
benefit by selling the depreciation to HUD. No portion of the syndication
proceeds would accrue to brokers. Community groups could expect the same
cash proceeds from HUD as any other developer selling to HUD without the
discount of the project being perceived as being more risky. The advantage
of this system to the Government would be its cost. Rather than paying
investors a 25 percent to 30 percent after-tax rate of return, the Treasury
could borrow at 4 percent to provide HUD with sufficient funds to pay
developers. The govemment might also save the cost of paying a broker.
The disadvantage would be the elimination of the investors protection
against foreclosure.
For the sake of bureaucratic simplicity, HUD would probably only want
to buy the depreciation and not all of the other items of taxable profit
and loss. Without any depreciation an absentee owner would have to pay a
5tax on the amortization as well as on the cash dividend. . The property
owner is unlikely to ever realize the amortization except in the form of
a reduced tax on sale. The sales price is likely to be for the mortgage
balance plus a constant. Even retaining the depreciation on the shell
would not be sufficient to shelter the tax on the amortization, particularly
after the first few years. Members of a cooperative, however, would receive
tax benefits from ownership. Their tax savings depends upon the amount of
interest and property taxes paid and bears no relationship to depreciation,
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amortization, or cash income. For this reason, the sale of the tax shelter
to HUD would encourage cooperatives and discourage absentee ownership.
The cheapest method of controlling tax shelters is by eliminating them
entirely. Unlike selling depreciation to HUD, simply paying the developer
a fee would totally eliminate the possibility of selling tax shelter on the
private market.
The primary problem with direct subsidies is a political one. The
Section 608 program became a national scandal after it had been in operation
for five years. The public realized that developers had been receiving
mortgages of 110 to 150 percent of total project costs. 6 The solution to
this problem, according to one commentator, is to use enough finesse to
cover up the fact of the subsidy and its extent. 7 Certainly 167(k) is
achieving this end, probably simply because the mechanism is too complex
for the general public to comprehend. Paying the fee directly to the
developer would be equally scandalous as adding the fee to the mortgage.
It would have the further political disadvantage of impacting the budget
immediately.
Probably the most fundamentaly different proposal for reducing
Governmental costs in rehabilitating low income housing is the Sunley
proposal to have the Government play the role of the developer. Under
his model, the Government would acquire a building suitable for rehabilitation
at the existing market price. Presumably, the use of eminent domain powers
could be grafted onto his model to facilitate the upgrading of an area
suficiently large to withstand any negative spillovers from the rest
of the neighborhood. Sunley calls for the selection of the contractor
simply on the basis of price. Presumably, the ability to train and employ
unskilled minority workers could also be a criterion. Finally, Sunley would
have the Government sell the building to the highest bidder willing to
operate it according to specified criteria for maintenance, rents, and tenant
105
selection. An open bidding process would eliminate the fear of a scandal
and the need'to cover up' the amount of profit. The deductibility of interest
and property taxes would be the only eeonomic advantage given to tenant
cooperatives to become owners. Yet, tenants and community groups would lack
the credit with financial institutions which large corporations and wealthy
individuals would possess. In fact, without at least FHA insurance of
the mortgage, to which anyone would have relatively equal access, the amount
of potential profit under a given set of operating rules would be a function
of the financing terms obtainable by the mortgagor.
Thus, a revised Sunley model would have the Government acquire the
site by either paying the market price or using eminent domain; selecting
a contractor based upon price and other factors; selling the property to a
private party using a subsidized loan. For the Government, this model would
eliminate the need to pr a developer's fee although it would increase
administrative costs by nearly as much. 8 Administrative costs would come out
of current budgetary expenditures rather than out of foregone tax revenues
as presently, or out of the program budget as with a system of a direct
developer's fee. For the tenants and the community whether the Government
or a profit-oriented firm served as the developer would be an insignificant
matter. The quality of the work by the architect, contractor, and management
agent and the employment of community people are more important concerns.
For those tenant and community groups who would be engaged as developers,
the taking over of this function by the Gdvernment would be a severe blow.
Suggestions to Improve the Incentives Providing Tenant Ownership
From the point of view of the Government, the 1039 rollover seems like
a conceptually marvelous idea. Were it to work it would not only turn the
first project over to the tenants, but it would provide for the development of
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a second project without any depreciation. The problem with this incentive,
as has been seen, is that it provides no real incentive except on projeots
which seem sour, and tenants are not likely to want.
Eliminating the reinvestment requirement from the non-recognition of
gain on the sale of the project to the tenants would provide a tremendous
incentive to investors. They would be able to keep the amount they already
had, at least theoretically, set aside in a sinking fund to pay the tax on a
disposition of the property in year 20 and they would no longer have the
threat of foreclosure. The amount in this fund in the sixth year of the
Newcastle project (immediately after the construction losses and the five
year writeoff have been taken) would be about $192,000. This amount compares
with a tax of $592,000 which would normally be payable on a disposition
at the mortgage balance or on a foreclosure at this point. Simply elim-
inating recapture and assessing the normal tax at capital gains rates as has
been suggested would reduce the tax to $355,000. Even then unless fore-
closure seemed imminent, investors would be better off putting aside the
cash flows from the project to pay the $327,000 tax due on a sale in the
twentieth year.
The amount of tax which the investors would be willing to pay and
donate the project to the tenants would be the $192,000 put away in the sink-
ing fund. The investors would then never have to worry about foreclosure.
At least from a political perspective such a policy would be beneficial
to the Government. Not only would tenant's be helped, but tax dollars would
accrue to the Treasury immediately rather than some 14 years later. Such
a policy would only be costly to the Government if the project would have
otherwise gone into foreclosure and the Government would have then been
able to collect a large gains tax.
Still, no matter how a sale to the tenants is structured, the five-year
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writeoff precludes tenant ownership until after this depreciation has been
taken.
An Ideal Sstem
An ideal system would provide developers with sufficient incentives
in a direct manner so as to minimize costs, be structured to avoid a
scandal, and provide for immediate tenant ownership. The safest way to
accomplish the first two of these ends is by some form of competitive
bidding. The Turnkey public housing program offers the basis of a workable
model. 9 Under this program the local housing authority advertizes for bids
on projects of specified types, sized, and sometimes locations. Once a
developer has been selected he works with the local authority in a similar
manner as he would with a private client. This form of procedures at
least in theory saves time and paper-work. If the project conforms to certain
specified requirements and satisfies various inspections and appraisals
made by the authority, then the authority buys the project from the developer.
Certain variations could be made in the program to satisfy the goals
set forth in this thesis. First, the financing could be obtained through
the sale of Govenment bonds and the issuing of a mortgage at about t
percent over the borrowing rate. This method of finance is currently being
used by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency. Moderate income borrowers
could pay the principal and as much of their share of the interest as they
can afford. Low income tenants would still pay just 25 percent or less of
their income.
Legal ownership of the property could be given to a cooperative of
tenants immediately; rather than to individuals as in Turnkey III; or to
a cooperative, bu only after at least 4 years as in a rollover. Tenants
could also be given a say in setting the criteria for the rehabilitation
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process, particularly when they are already occupants of the rehabilitated
structure. While more research is needed as to the emperical workings of
Turnkey, the result of such a system would seem to be tenant owned and
controlled rehabilitated housing at minimal cost to the Government.
Conclusion
On balance the tax shelter mechanism for the rehabilitation of housing
works reasonably well. What remains to be seen is whether the amount of tax
savings afforded wealthy investors is costless because so much of it will
be recaptured through foreclosure or if the cost is considerable because
the Government is buying an effective foreclosure prevention service.
The most expensive aspect of the rehabilitation incentive and subsidy
mechanism is the 236 interest subsidy program. This flaw, however, can
be remedied through direct Governmental loans and without regard to changes
in the tax laws. The inefficiency resulting from the fact that the average
investor is in a higher tax bracket than the marginal investor can be remedied
by amending Section 167(k) to make it operate as a tax credit. The only
excessive cost which cannot be legislated away all by itself is the amount
going to the syndication broker. As more. brokers enter the field, however,
this cost might also be reduced.
In terms of tenant and community control and ownership, the most effect-
ive use of the present system is made by such groups serving as developers
rather than hoping to secure ownership on a 1039 rollover. The simple
reduction of the gains tax down to the amount already put aside by investors'
in their sinking fund would be a far more effective mechanism for securing
tehant ownership than the present rollover.
Still, an ideal incentive and subsidy mechanism can be constructed
that surpasses these marginal changes both in terms of cost and in terms of
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tenant ownership and control. Such a system would be a modified Turnkey
public housing program.
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1. Portions of this section appeared in Betnun and Judelson, op.cit.,
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2. Taylor presented his suggestions at a conference at Harvard Law School,
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Government Policy," pp. 720-725. Haar made his suggestion at a
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3. For a more complete discussion of securities questions as they relate to
syndicating limited partnership interests in rehabilitation projects,
see Betnun & Judelson, op.cit., pp. 18-251 See also Judelson, op.cit.,
pp. 31-38.
4. Investors at Boston Financing Technology Group must sign a statement
saying that they are in at least a 50 percent bracket.
5. See pp. 42-43
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expenses than for program items. See Aaron Wildavsky, Politics of the
Budgetary Process, p. 103.
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APPENDIX - FORMULAE TO CALCULATE THE CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
Derivation of the Formulae
In deriving the formula to calculate the capital contribution the first
step is to be able to find the value of the sinking fund. Here the most
important values are the year in which the sinking fund must begin and the
amount of after-tax cash flows which must be tucked away in that year. These
values can be determined by taking the value of the after-tax cash flow in
the presumed year of sale, discounting it at 4 percent back one year, adding
the result to the after-tax cash flow in the previous year, and discounting
it back another year. This process continues until the accumulated, dis-
counted cash flows have a value of zero. On a rehabilitation project where
the 5-year write-off is taken, where sale is assumed to occur in the 20th
year at the mortgage balance, where interest on the sinking fund is assumed
to accrue at 4 percent per year, where the maximum 6 percent cash dividend
is- assumed to be paid, and where the investors are normally in a 50 percent
bracket, the sinking fund will have to start in the fifth year of the project.
Part of the after-tax cash flows in that year and all of the after-tax cash
flows in the following years must be allocated to the sinking fund. Know-
ing this fact the equation for the amount allocated to the sinking fund in
the 5th year for the jth iteration* can be stated as:
S 20 Cd-Br(Cd+Ai-Dj) TsBc
(1) _dip 0
(1'04)5 i.6 (1 .04 )i (1.04)20
Where:
Si - amount allocated to sinking fund in 5th year in the jth iteration
Cd - Cash dividend
Br - Income tax bracket
Ai = Amortization in the ith year
* As will be seen later, because of a step-up in basis, S will have to
be calculated several times, each time with a different value for j.
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Ts - Taxable gain on sale (assumed at mortgage balance)
Bc = Capital gains tax bracket
Dij. Depreciation in the' ith year and jth iteration of the step-up
Solving for Sj, the formula becomes:
Sj - (1.o4)5 Te Be 20 Cd-Br(Cda Ai - Dij)
(1.04)0 1.6(1.04)1
Simplifying:
(2) Sj- Ts Be . Cd-Br(Cd+Ai-Di,j)
(l.04)1-5 =. 1.4i5
Once S is determined, the amount of the capital contribution can be
calculated. The capital contribution is that amount of money on which
the after-tax cash flows accruing before the sinking fund begins, yields
a specified rate of return, R. The present value of the after-tax cash
flow in the year of construction can be expressed as:
Br E
1+R
Where:
Br = Income tax bracket
E - Expensed items during construction period
R - Rate of return expected.
During the next 4 years, years 2 through 5, the after-tax cash flows can
be represented by:
5 Br (Di, j - Ai - Cd) + Cd
. (1 + R)i
Where:
Br - Income tax bracket
Di,j. Depreciation taken in the ith year the jth iteration
Cd - Cash dividend
The value of the sinking fund, Si, gIust be subtracted.
Summing all of these expressions gives a formula for the jth calculation
of the capital contribution, Cj.
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C Br E + Br(Di -.Ai Cd) + Cd - Sj
(1+R i=2 (1 + R)i
This formula assumes that all of the capital contribution is received at
the start of the 1st year of the construction period. However, sophisticated
developers have found that the capital contribution can be increased
significantly if it is phased over time. Generally, investors are asked
to pay one-third of their capital contribution at the time they sign the
agreement, one-third at the completion of construction (final closing),
*nd one-third at the later completion of the renting of 95 percent or so
occupancy or two years after the first payment. This type of phasing
reduces certain risks for the investor and allows him to use part of his
money elsewhere for awhile. To incorporate the phasing into the formula
for the capital contribution requires that the number of payments divided
by their present value be represented. The most general expression for this
concept is:
h+1
n1 / (1+R)
Where:
n - Number of years over which payments are made
i - year
R - Rate of return expected
Combining this expression with the previous formula for calculating
the capital contribution yields a new formula:
(4) j - n+1 Br E + Br(Di,j - Ai-Cd)+Cd S
1/(1+R)i (1+R) i-2 (1+R)i (1+R)5
Where: Lo
j a Capital contribution in the jth iteration
n w Number of phased payments (assumed 1 year apart)
i a Year
R = Rate of return expected
Br = Income tax bracket
E - Expensed items during construction period
Di I - Depreciation taken in the ith year and jth iteration
Ai - Amortization in the ith year
Cd m Cash dividend
Sj - Amount of depreciation allocated to sinking fund in the 5th year
and the jth iteration
The final sophistication to be added is the step-up of the depreciable basis
owing to the equity invested by the limited partners in excess of the equity
implied by FHA. The depreciable basis to be written off over five years
for a taxpayer also serving as the developer would be the total development
cost of the project, i.e. the mortgage plus the implied equity, less the
non-depreciable land and slowly depreciable shell. In this case the cost of
the shell is assumed to be negligible. .The equity required of an outside
investor is considerably in excess of that which is required by FHA. This
excess equity or developer's fee can be depreciated over 5 years. The
additional depreciation adds to the capital contribution which an investor
is willing to make. The additional capital contribution can also be
depreciated over 5 years, leading to an infinite series. Symbolically:
(5) C W A Db -- 30  A Co - AMb1 4...Cj1 .Mdbj 4 Cj ADbja-*,..
Where:
0 - Capital contribution initially
L8j - Change in the capital contribution in the jth iteration
AIbj - Change in the depreciable basis in the jth iteration
Going back to the original formulae:
(2 j-Ts Be , 20 Cd - Br (Cd + Ai D t)(2) Si-Tjc 2
(1.04)[5 i.6 (1.04)1-5-
(4) G - n+1 Br E + Br(Di,j - Ai-Cd)+Cd Sj
1/(1+R)i (1+R) 1=2 (+)(+)
By definition:
(6) 4CJ - C +1 - Cj
Substituting equation 4 into equation 6:
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(?) AC - ~ Br(Di
r al+Rj+d
iting from equation 2 for SJ1and j
(8) ACj. n+1
, 'j+1- D, j)
(1+R) !.
20
Br(Di, j+l-Di, j)+ 6Br(i,j)/1.4 jl-%j)B/.
(1+R)i (f+R)5
j+1 - Di, j anddTsj for Tsj+1-Tsj yields:t
Br Dij j +
(1+R)i
(Br&Di, j/1.01i-5).(ATsj Bc/1.041 5)
i.6 (1+R) 5
If the depreciable basis, Db, is less than or equal to .$15,000 per dwelling
unit, then for i greater than 6 and for any value of j, 4Di -O andATs -0.
Thus equation 9 simplifies to:
Br Di.9 + BrAD6,j/l*04
(l+R)I (1+R)5
Again if Db is less than or equal to $15,000 per unit, in years 2 through 6,
&Dij - o.24Dbj. Thus:
C0 = n+1
n1
5ABr(o.2) Dbj/1.04
(1+R)I-
As seen in equation 5, beginning withdDbi, 6Dbj - 4cj.0.
** 5
n+1 £
- 1/(l+R)" i2
1.0
Br (o.2)4CJ.1
(1+R)i
+ Br(0.2)$j.l/.04 3
&C - Step-up in the capital contribution (up to $15,000 of depreciable basis)
j w Interation of the step-up
i = fear
n - Number of years of phasing
Br - Income tax bracket
R - Rate of return expected
Substitu
(-1)
Thus:
(12) dC
Where:
.5
(9) C3 n+1
&"1/(l+R):i i=2
(10) AC n+1
1/(1+R i 2
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Once Db, the dppreciable basis, is greater than $15,000 per unit, equations
10 and 11 do not apply and equation 9 must be used. Assuming that the
depreciable life of the improvement is 20 years, further simplifications
can be made. Using the double declining balance method of depreciation
yields annual depreciation equal to 10 percent per year of the as-yet
underpreciated amount. After the 10th year, however, straight-line
depreciation of the balance yields larger amounts of depreciation. Thus,
a switch-over to straight-line is made at that point. The change in the
tax on sale is affected by only the depreciation not taken. This depreciation
is simply the depreciation available in what would be the 21st year of the
project (20th year of the depreciation schedule). Computing these
changes yields a substitute equation for equation 9 for Db greater than
$15,000 per unit.
(13) 4C - n+l Br ADi + .248& Dbj_- (-.o006Db )
L3./(+~ii. (1+R):' (1+R)5
Substituting &Cj.1 for &Dbj (from equation 5); simplifying, and summing
an infinite number of iterations gives:
(14) AC' - n+1 , + .240.
12 (1+R)i (1+R)5
Where:
40'. Step-up in the capital contribution (beyond $15,000 of depreciable basis)
j = Iteration of the step-up
i = Year
n = Number of years of phawing
Br - Income tax bracket
R - Rate of return expected
The final capital contribution can be expressed as:
(15) C - Co + aC +4c'
The formulae wnion are important are 2,4,12,14, ani 15
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Calculation of the Capital Contribution
The capital 'contribution for the Newcastle case can be readily calculated
from the formulae, and the income-expense analysis (pp. 4 3- 4 4 , sua.)
First the amount needed to be allocated to the sinking fund in the fifth
year before the step-up must be calculated: (based on equation 2)
20
(16) so - Ts Bc -
(1.04)15 i.6
Evaluating the tax on sales
Cd-Br(Cd + A - Di, j)
(1.04)I.~5
(17) Ts Bc - , 0(0.30) -324,340 x .555m.(1.04)13 1/*555
The after-tax cash flows come from the income-expense analysis.
to the fifth year and summed they equal $116,870.
20
(18) Cd - Br(Cd + Ai - Di,o) 3 16,870
i.6 (1-04)i-5
Year
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
[d-Br(Cd+Ai-Di,)
After-tax
Cash Flow
126630 x
1320 x
1090 x
850 x
580 x
290 x
(10 x
(350 x
710 x
100 x
1530 x
1980 x
2470 x
3010 x
3580 x
1/(1o04)-5
Discount
-962
.925
.889
.855
.822
*790
.760
.731
*703
.676
.650
.625
.601
.577
.555
180,000
Discounted
Discounted
Value
122110
1220
970
720
480
230
(10
260
500
750
990
1240
1490
1740
1980
116,870
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The amount allocated to the sinking fund in the fifth year (from equation
16) is given by:
(19) So - 180,000 - 116,870 - 63,130
Knowing S0, the initial value for the capital contribution can be cal-
culated:
5
(20) Co - n+1 Br E +1
imo'/(+R)i (l+R) i-2
The phasing factor is computed:
Br (Di,o-Aj-Cd) + Cd
(1+R) J a1
(21) n+1 - 2+12
1/(1+R)i 1/1.251
The present value of the expenses during the construction period is:
(22) Br E . .5(1300) - 65000 - 52,000
(1+R) 1.25 1.25
The present value of the after-tax cash flow becomes:
(2) 4(23) Br (0.2) Dbn - Ai -Cd) + Cd
1..2 (1+R)i
Br(Dito - A - Cd) + Cd
After-tax cash flow
0.50 (125,100 - 3,880 - 8,350) + 8,350
0.50 (125,100 - 4,190 - 8,350) + 8,350
0.50 125,100 - 4,530 - 8,350) + 8,350
0.50 (125,100 - 4,890 - 8,350) + 8,350
- 238,100
91+R)i
Discount
.640
.,512
.410
*328
The portion of the after-tax cash flows in the 5th year allocated to the
linking fund:
(24) So
(1+R)5
S6 ,130 - 20,850
.328
Combining all of the terms (from equation 20):
Co - 1.23(52,000 + 238,100 - 20,710) - 332,350
- - 1.23
Year
2
3
4
5
Present
Value
81,490
65,110
52,020
39,430
238,100
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The step-up in the capital contribution,
(25) 'Cj - n+)-
1=2
+ 2)A c j/1 .04 J
(1+R)5
Br(0.2) ACj-1
(1+R)I-
As seen in equation 21, the phasing factor,
(26) n+l
1 /(1+R),
- 1.23
Simplifying the next term:
5
(27) 7 Br(0.2)
1.2 (1+R)
Br(0.2) 4&Cj.i
Change in basis
0.1 4 0jl.1
0.1 A Cj-i
0.1 A Cj..a
0.1 4 Gj.1
x
x
x
U. 18906C j
1/(1+R)i
Discount
.640
.512
.410
.328
Present Value
.0640 A Cj.i
.0512 A Cj-i
.0410 A Cj..1
.0328 A Cj.
.1890 A 0j.1
Simplifying the final term of the step-up equation:
, 0.50(0.2)acj/l.o4
1/.328
- 0.03164cj0_
Combining terms, the increase in the capital contribution (from equation 25):
(29) 0- 1.23(.1890AC .1 + .03164c0.),
or
(30) Ac - 0.2713 4C
from equation 5, AC0 - 4Di. And, ADi is the initial step-up in the
depreciable basis.
Originally, the depreciable basis was equal to the implied equity, plus
the mortgage, less the expensed items, less the land, and less the shell
costs, or $1,251,000. The only item which changes with the step-up is the
i
Year
. (28) Br(0.2)4 C /l.04
(1+R)5
4 a 
i.
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implied equity. The initial capital contribution replaces it. Thus:
(31) AC0 -AfDb 1 - Co - Implied equity
or
(32) AC0 - 332,350 - 139,000 - 193,350
When CO is added to the original depreciable basis, the new depreciable
basis becomes:
(33) C1 . Co +4co - 1,251,000 + 193,350 w $1,444,350
Since the buildings in question contain 100 dwelling units, $1,500,000 is
the maximum depreciation which can be taken to remain within the $15,000
per unit limit imposed by Section 167(k). This limit will have to be
watched.
The next step-up can be taken from equation 30.
(34) AC1 - 0.27134C0 - 0.2713(193,350) - 52,500
Adding C1(-l,444,350) to 4 C(-52,500)yields c 2(-,496,850) -- only $3150
less than $1,500,000. 4C 2 can equal no more than $3150. Again from
equation 30:
(35) AC 2 - 0-2713 C1
But not all of AC1 can be stepped using the five year write-off thus:
(36) AC2 .. 0.2713(4C1 -4C&) - 3150
WhereAC' must be stepped up using double declining balance depreciation.0
Substituting for A C0 :
(37) o.2713(52,500 -AC;) - 3150
Solving for A C :
(38) AC' - 40,700
All further step-ups must be based on equation 14t
*0 5 Bhi_ +05(39) C' - n+l l Br&Dij + -4j-1l 1/(l+R)1 Ii2 (
When R - 0.25 and n - 2, equation 39 simplifies to:
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(40) 4C' -
-.2 (0.844_ + 0.083 C
or
(41) A C' - 0.20544 C
ivaluatingAC' beginning with ACI - 40,700 (equation 38):
(42) 4' . 10,590
0.2054 AC AC
1 0.2054 x 40,700 - 8,450
2 0.2054 x 8,450 - 1,710
3 0.2054 x 1,710 - 350
4 0.2054 x 350 - 70
5 0.2054 70 - 10
Finally, evaluating the value of the capital
10,590
contribution from equation 15:
OO
(43) C - Co + 1 ACj + Ac' - 332,350 + (52,500 + 3,150) + 10,590jwl
(44) C - 398,600
The final capital contribution is thus $398,600. Each of the 3 phased
payments equal $132,900. The increase in the depreciable basis is equal
to the final capital contribution minus the originally implied equity
($398,600 - 139,000 - 259,600). The depreciable basis then equals
$1,251,000 plus $259,600 or $1,510,600.
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GLOSSARY
ADJUSTED BASIS The original basis of a property minus the depreciation
taken until that timeg the book value.
AMORTIZATION - The amount of debt service which pays the principal of the
mortgage. The portion of the debt service payment going toward amort-
isation increases as the mortgage is repaid.
BASIC RENT - The amount of rent based upon the subsidized interest rate in
an FHA project.
BASIS - For tax purposes the cost of a piece of property minus any amount
deductible during the construction period.
BROKER - A person or firm who sells the tax shelter to the investor for
the developer. The broker assumes liability for adhering to all securities
regulations.
BUILDERS AND SPONSORS PROFIT AND RISK ALLOWANCE - The amount FHA allows
a- developer and a contractor for their services. It is equal to 10 percent
of development costs other than land. The developer and contractor must
establish at least a loose identity of interest to receive this much profit.
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION - The amount which the investors pay the developer
for a limited partnership interest in the project.
CAPITAL GAINS - The form of taxation levied on a property held for a long
period of time. Beginning in 1972 capital gains rates are equal to one-
half of the ordinary income tax rates.
CAPITALIZATION - A method of determining the value of a property based upon
the cash flows it generates. The amount of the cash flows are divided
by the rate of return desired to determine the value of the property in
excess .of the mortgage.
CLOSING COSTS - The amount of local taxes, legal fees, recording fees
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and other costs paid in transferring the legal ownership of a property.
CONSTANT - The amount of the fixed annual payment on the mortgage. It is
equal to the sum of the amortization and interest charges. As payments
are made the percent going toward amortization increases; the percent
going toward interest decreases.
COOPERATIVE - Apartments owned by the residents. Each tenant owns an
undivided share of the entire project.
CRANE V. COMMISSIONER 331 U.S. 1 - Supreme Court case which held that
the purchase price of a property includes any mortgages acquired or assumed.
DEBT SERVICE - The amount paid toward the mortgage including both interest
and amortization.
DEPRECIATION - Income tax deduction at a fixed rate permitted the owner
of a building as compensation for wear and tear or obsolescence.
DEPRECIABLE BASIS - The portion of the amount paid for a property which
can be depreciated.
DEVELOPER - The person, organization, or firm which coordinates the
construction or rehabilitation of real estate.
DISCOUNT RATE - The rate at which future cash flows are reduced per year to
allow them to be compared directly with current cash flows.
DIVIDEND - The amount of cash paid an investor per year. It is limited
to 6 percent on an FHA - insured, limited-dividend project.
DOUBLE DECLINING BALANCE METHOD - Most accelerated method allowable for
computing depreciation on newly-constructed housing. Before the 1969
Tax Reform Act this was the most accelerated method on rehabilitation. It
is computed by multiplying the amount not-yet depreciated times twice
the rate necessary to fully depreciate the property over its useful life.
EQUITY - Amount of cash or the equivalent invested in a property,
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FO)RECLOSURE - Repossession of a property through a court order as a
result of an unpaid debt on that property.
IMPLIED EQUITY - In an FHA-insured project, the amount of cash or its
equivalent its owner is assumed to have invested in it. Generally 10
percent of the total development costs.
KNETSCH v. U.S. 364 U.S. 361 - Supreme Court case which held that a
transaction constructed simply for tax benefits was illegal.
LEASED HOUSING - A form of public housing in which a local housing
authority leases dwelling units in private housing for occupancy by
tenants eligible for public housing subsidies.
LIMITED DIVIDEND CORPORATION - A corporation which agrees to limit the
amount of profit it takes on a FHA-insured project. It is entitled to
a mortgage equal to 90 percent of the total development costs.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP - A legal organization consisting of one or more
general partners who have total operational control and total liability
concerning the affairs of the partnership, and one or more limited partners
who serve as passive investors with liability limited to their investment.
For tax purposes a limited partnership must be shown to lack two of the
following corporate characteristics: 1) limited liability for all the
partners, 2) centralization of management, 3) free transferability of
interest among partners, and 4) continuity of the life of the partnership.
MARKET RENT - Rent based upon the full market interest rate.
MORTGAGE - A loan to finance the purchase of property secured by giving
its holder the right to acquire the property if payments are missed.
NET AMOUNT REALIZED - In section 1039 of the Internal Revenue Code, the
amount received on the disposition of a property, including the amount of
any mortgage, transferred but minus the amount of any closing costs incurred.
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NON-PROFIT CORPORATION - Legal organisational form chartered by a state
entitled to receive mortgage insurance from FIA on 100 percent of the
total development costs.
PRESENT VALUE - The amount which a cash flow is worth today after being
discounted to the present.
RECAPTURE - Taxation in the year of sale of the amount of accelerated
depreciation taken in prior years.
RENT SUPPLEMENTS - Title I, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. It
subsidized the rent of a certain number of tenants residing in 221(d)3
or 236 projects who are eligible for public housing. These tenants pay
25 percent of their income for rent.
ROLLOVER - See SECTION 1039
SECTION 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code - Allows the cost of rehab-
ilitation for occupancy by low or moderate income families to be depreciated
over five years.
V SECTION 221(d)3 of the National Housing Act - Provides loans to sponsors
of moderate income multi-family housing developments at 3 percent interest
over 40 years. It has been administratively superceded by Section 236.
SECTION 221(d)4 of the National Housing Act - Provides mortgage insurance
for 90 percent of project expenses over 40 years for the development of
multi-family housing. Developers must agree to limit their profits.
SECTION 236 of the National Housing Act - Provides mortgage insurance,
for moderate-income multi-family developments also provides a debt service
subsidy on the difference between a market interest loan over 40 years and
a 1 percent loan over this term. Mortgages are 100 percent of total
development costs for non-profit sponsors and 90 percent for limited dividend
sponsors.
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SECTION 312 of the Housing Act of 1964 - Provides direct loans from HUD
for 100 percent of rehabilitation costs at 3 percent interest over 20
years. Priority is given to owner-occupants. Loans must be in code
enforcement or urban renewal areas or the property and area must meet
other specified criteria.
SECTION 1039 of the Internal Revenue Code - Provides that no gain be
recognized for tax purposes on the disposition of a 221(d)3 or 236 project
to the tenants. The net amount realized from disposition, including the
mortgage, must be reinvested in a similar project. The depreciation allowed
on the second project is reduced by the amount taken on the first. The
process is referred to as a "rollover."
SINKING FUND - A hypothetical fund provided out of the earnings from the
early years of a project which when set aside at a conservative interest
rate grows to pay all the taxes occuring in the later years of the project.
STRAIGHT-LINE DEPRECIATION - A form of depreciation which allows a
constant amount each year over the useful life of the project.
SYNDICATION - The process of selling limited partnership interests or
other ownership interests in a housing development.
TAX CREDIT - An allowance to directly reduce the amount of taxes payable
rather than simply the taxable income.
TAX PREFERENCE ITEMS - Capital gains, accelerated depreciation, and other
tax deductions which subject a taxpayer to a minimum 10 percent tax on the
excess of such items over $30,000 plus the amount of the normal tax paid.
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST - The sum of all project expenses allowed by the
FHA as the basis for a mortgage it insures.
TURNKEY - Private development of public housing. A private developer will
construct the housing and "turn the key" over to local public housing author-
ity, also known as Turnkey I. Turnkey II allows private management agents to
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manage public housing. Turnkey III allows tenants to purchase the units
in which they live through amortization payments and their own labor.
TURNKEY LEASING - Public housing program where private developers lease
an entire project to a local housing authority for 40 years under Section
10(c) of the Housing Act of 1937.
USEFUL LIFE - The period of time over which wear and tear or obsolescence will
render valueless a building or the improvements on a building. Depre-
ciation is normally computed overthis period.
